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Conflicting Preferences in Business
Bankruptcy: The Need for Different Rules
in Different Chapters
Brook E. Gotberg'
ABSTRACT: The law of preferential transfers permits the trustee of a
bankruptcy estate to avoid transfers made by the debtor to a creditor on
account of a prior debt in the 90 days leading up to the bankruptcy
proceeding. The standard for avoiding these preferential transfers is one of
strict liability, on the rationale that preference actions exist to ensure that all
general creditors of the bankruptcy estate recover the same proportional
amount, regardless of the debtor's intent to favor any one creditor or the
creditor's intent to be so favored. But preference law also permits certain
exceptions to strict preference liability and gives the estate trustee discretion in
pursuing preference actions. This undermines the policy of equal distribution
by permitting some creditors to fare better than others in the bankruptcy
distribution. However, these practices are arguably necessary to promote the
conflicting bankruptcy policies that seek to maximize the estate for the benefit
of creditors and also encourage the survival of struggling businesses.
As a result, the law of preferences is internally inconsistent and controversial,
attempting unsuccessfully to serve multiple policy masters simultaneously.
Much of the analysis on preferences up to now has proposed amending
preference law generally in an attempt to satisfy these often conflicting
demands. This Article recommends a more dramatic approach: returning
preference law to a mechanism of equal distribution in liquidation
proceedings by eliminating true exceptions to the rule, and doing away with
preference law in the context of bankruptcy reorganization.
* Academic Fellow, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I would like
to thank Susan Block-Lieb, Ken Kettering, Lawrence Ponoroff, and Michael D. Sousa for their
helpful advice, and Trent Maxwell for his valuable research assistance. Any errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Preferential transfer law in bankruptcy has long been the subject of
significant controversy.' Particularly in business cases, creditors have
consistently and strenuously objected to a trustee's ability in bankruptcy to
avoid or reverse transfers from the debtor to a creditor made on account of a
legitimate debt in the go days prior to bankruptcy. 2 The trustee can do so even
if the payment was warranted and the transferee had no reason to suspect that
the debtor would later enter bankruptcys because preference law is one of
strict liability.4
The following conversation is a common response by defendant creditors
to preference proceedings. Soon after an attorney representing a corporate
client in a chapter i1 bankruptcy filed an action to recover a preferential
payment on a construction contract, he got a call from the secretary for the
owner of the construction company. She said, with the tone of someone who
expects to resolve the issue over the phone, "My boss has a few questions that
he wants me to ask you. Do you dispute that we performed the construction
work?"
"No."
"And we did a good job?"
"Yes."
"You don't have any problems at all with the work we did?"
"No."
"You don't dispute the amount of the invoice?"
i. See generally C. Robert Morris, Jr., Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and
Floating Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV. 737,737 (197o) ("The law is wrong.... [T]he law of preferences
is not the appropriate vehicle for handling secret liens in bankruptcy."); Robert Weisberg,
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV.
3,4-5 (1986).
2. The validity of preferential transfers, but for the bankruptcy filing, distinguishes
preferences from fraudulent conveyance actions, which have historically been much easier to
defend as a matter of policy. See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its
Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 5o5, 513 (1977) ("[F] raudulent conveyance law embodies a general
ideal... of nonhindrance of creditors ... made operational through the effectuation of the more
specific ideals of Truth, Respect, and Evenhandedness as well as a general, residual prohibition
of conduct which hinders creditors in attempting to satisfy their claims.").
3. Erwin I. Katz et al., Types of Bankruptcy-related Disputes, in ABI GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY
MEDIATION 11 (ist ed. 2005) ("Preference actions seem particularly unfair: creditors are often
shocked to learn that they may have to repay money to a debtor for receiving payment that was
lawful at the time but has become actionable upon the filing of bankruptcy."); Lissa Lamkin
Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78, 95 (observing that lenders objected to the removal of the intent
requirement for preference law on the grounds that the law would be unfair if applied to
unknowing creditors).
4. Note that strict liability applies only to initial transferees, not to subsequent transferees.
Transfers may not be recovered from subsequent transferees that take for value, in good faith,
without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer. II U.S.C. § 5 5 o(b) (2012). This Article
generally assumes application to initial transferees.
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"No."
"And your client owed us the money it paid us?"
'Yes."
"And you admit that we earned it?"
,Yes."
"And you want the money back?!"
'Yes."
At this point there was a lengthy pause. Then the secretary stammered,
with some incredulity: "Okay, I'll tell my boss."s
This dismay is natural among creditors who are non-repeat players in
bankruptcy contexts.6 Preference avoidance requires the creditor who
received the targeted transfer (the "preferred creditor") to return the value
received from the debtor. In exchange the creditor gets a claim against the
estate for a pro rata distribution of the debtor's remaining assets. This often
translates to exchanging full payment for pennies on the dollar, with the
remaining debt discharged in bankruptcy. From the preferred creditor's
viewpoint, this exchange marks a dramatic loss of value.7 Preferred creditors
who must disgorge these preferential payments naturally feel blindsided. By
its nature, preference law targets transfers made with no intent to defraud
other creditors, no reasonable cause to believe that the debtor so intended,
and no knowledge or reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the
time the funds were transferred.8 Payment is generally warranted and
accepted in good faith, with no warning that a bankruptcy would thereafter
commence and a preference action brought.
5. Conversation with Brent Wride, S'holder, Ray Quinney & Nebeker, in Salt Lake City,
Utah (Feb. 6, 2013).
6. See Jennie D. Latta, What Every Tennessee Lawyer Should Know About Preferential Transfers,
TENN. BJ., Oct. 1991, at 26 (noting that recipients of a trustee's demand for return of a preference
is generally met with outrage); see alsoJudy B. Calton & Seth D. Gould, Defending a Preference Action,
MIcH. BJ.,July 1993, at 666 ("It is no wonder that clients hate preference actions.").
7. This discount is commonly referred to as being paid in "bankruptcy dollars."
8. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A-N. 5963, 6139 ("To
argue that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a preference and that creditors
should not be required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong
bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors."); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.1 3' and
H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 4 th
Cong. 1855 (1976) ("Logically and theoretically, the knowledge of the recipient of the
preference has nothing to do with equality of distribution. Equality is determined by the fact that
all creditors are being treated reasonably alike. So, if two creditors received a payment... and
one had knowledge and one did not of the insolvency of the debtor, that has really no relevancy
to equality of treatment."); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an Irresolute Endorsementfor
Scientifc Rationalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, 199 3 Wis. L. REv. 1439, 1449 (noting that
any formulation of preferences that focuses on culpability is inappropriate because the values of
preference law are threatened by transfers depleting the estate without regard to state of mind).
[Vol. 100:51
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More surprisingly, even repeat players who might anticipate a preference
action express disapproval and discomfort with preference proceedings.9 To
the extent these players are general unsecured creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings, they are likely to benefit from successful preference actions,
because the money recovered will go to benefit the estate, and by extension,
its unsecured creditors.' ° Presumably, with a sufficient number of iterations,
these repeat players would benefit more from preference law as recipients
than they would lose by being the target of an occasional preferential transfer
action. Thus, one would expect the law of preferences to be more popular
among creditors, providing an occasional windfall and promoting the old
adage that "equity is equality."I
Crucially, however, preference liability is not contingent on whether
avoiding the preference would benefit the estate's unsecured creditors.'-
Whether there is a return for unsecured creditors does not inform the
elements of preference liability or the exceptions thereto, although it is likely
to inform a trustee's decision to pursue such an action.ls Rather, the standard
for a preferential transfer is whether the transfer made the preferred creditor
better off than it would have been otherwise.'4 If so, the transfer should be
returned to the estate to ensure that all similarly situated creditors receive
assets on the same pro rata basis.15 Accordingly, this standard promotes
9. SeeJohn Haggerty, Remarks at Field Hearing, ABI Annual Spring Meeting (Apr. 19,
2013), available at http://commission.abi.org/minutes (download "April 19, 2013 Washington,
D.C.") ("I think bankruptcy has lost credibility with the general trade.... They don't have
confidence in the process, for whatever reason, but when you talk to them about why they don't,
they've all been chased by frivolous, spurious preference claims. The cost runs away.").
1o. In some circumstances courts have permitted the pursuit of avoidance proceedings that
did not profit unsecured creditors, but instead went to pay for the costs of administration. These
cases have been the subject of some controversy. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
ii. SeeCanightv. Gen. Fin. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841, 844 (E.D. Il1. 1940), affd, 123 F.2d 9 8
(7 th Cir. 194 1); AdamJ. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1399, 1454 (2012) (noting that bankruptcy policy is built around the distributional norm that
"similar creditors should have similar recoveries"); Ponoroff, supra note 8, at 1447 ("Bankruptcy
law must regulate preferences precisely because preferential transfers belie the bankruptcy
maxim that 'equality is equity."').
12. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Dick Corp., 351 F. 3 d 290, 293 ( 7 th Cir. 2003) (noting that
trustees may only recover avoided transfers "for the benefit of the estate," but this does not
require a benefit to unsecured creditors); Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F-3 d 898, 905 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding that a trustee or DIP is not required to demonstrate a direct benefit to creditors
from preference recovery); Thomas D. Goldberg, Curbing Abusive Preference Actions: Rethinking
Claims on Behalf of Administratively Insolvent Estates, AM. BANKR. INST.J., May 2004, at 14.
13. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
14. See I IU.S.C. § 5 4 7(b)( 5 ) (2012).
15. Pro rata distribution simply means that each creditor receives assets that amount to the
same percentage of the amount owed as all other creditors. For example, if the estate owes $1ooo
to three creditors in the amounts of $5oo, $300, and $2oo, respectively, and the estate
distribution totals $5oo, all creditors would receive 5o% of the amount owed as distribution, the
first $250, the second $15o, and the third $1oo. Although such a distributional scheme is largely
intuitive to those within the American legal system, other methods of distribution have been used
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"fairness" by assuring that no single creditor gets a larger percentage return
than others. However, the generally negative response to the law of
preferential transfers suggests that the underlying policy of preference law, its
implementation, or both, are flawed, and real reform is necessary.
Some of the primary objections to preference law focus on the costs
associated with a preference action, for both the debtor's estate and the
targeted creditor, , 6 particularly in light of the many confusing and uncertain
exceptions for which a given transaction may or may not qualify.'7 These costs
have led some creditors to view preference claims as "nothing more than
nuisance litigation,"' 8 requiring a quick settlement to avoid costs in spite of
potential defenses.'9 These costs can be traced largely to conflicts raised by
the implementation of distinct policies informing preference law.
From a policy standpoint, preference law is internally inconsistent. On
the one hand, it purports to be a law of strict liability intended to ensure equal
distribution: regardless of the merit of any particular creditor or transaction,
across history and cultures. For example, under Jewish law, an estate would be divided among
unsecured creditors equally up to the amount of their debt, with the consequence that smaller
creditors would receive a higher proportionate payout. For example, in the case of three creditors
with claims of $300, $200, and $1oo, a $500 estate would be distributed by first giving each
creditor $ too, satisfying C's claim in full, and then dividing the remaining $2oo between A and
B, paying B in full and leaving Awith a $ioo deficit. SeeLouis Edward Levinthal, TheEarly Histoiy
of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 234 (1918).
16. See Comments of Kathy Tomlin, ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter ii, AM.
BANKR. INST. (May 21, 2013), http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/2i may
2013/KathyTomlinTestimony.pdf ("Defending against preference demands is a very time-
consuming and expensive exercise .... All of us . . . are frustrated by the time and the cost
required to sort out the merits of a preference demand and evaluate our defenses."); David
Lander & Thompson Coburn, A Snapshot of Recent Avoidance Cases, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER,
Feb. 2004 (suggesting that defendants in preference actions are often dubious that the net total
of preference recoveries significantly increases distribution to unsecured creditors).
17. See Comments of Kathy Tomlin, supra note 16 ("Many credit professionals are confused
by the preference statute, particularly the various defenses available to creditors."). Although in
most circumstances such a concern is best met with a more careful revision or narrowing of
exceptions, here the exceptions are problematic primarily because they seek to promote policies
that are at odds with the underlying purpose of the statute. Accordingly it is not clear that any
amendment or clarification would resolve the underlying tension.
18. Statement of David Pollack, ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter i r, AM. BANKR.
INST. (June 4, 2013), http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/o4jun213/
ABIFieldHearingTranscript6-o4 -13_Final.doc.
19. Written Statement by National Ad Hoc Group of Bankruptcy Practitioners in Support of
Venue Fairness (Nov. 22, 2013), http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/
22noV2013/Written-Venue%2oStatement-for-ABI-Commission.pdf ("[W]e sometimes... agree to
pay all or a portion of a preference demand simply to avoid the high costs of defending against a
preference claim, which can exceed the amount of preference liability in controversy" (citing
Testimony ofJoe Chiavone)); Deborah L. Thorne &John T. Gregg, A Partial Solution to "Preference
Litigation Run Amok, "AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2007, at 22, 22 ("The filing of avoidance actions
without prior reasonable due diligence is often considered tantamount to extortion because
litigation costs in some adversary proceedings may exceed the amount of the alleged liability unless
a settlement can be achieved at the outset of the adversary proceeding.").
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all similarly-situated creditors must share in the estate on a pro rata basis.20
On the other hand, it discriminates in favor of certain creditors by establishing
exceptions to the rule of strict liability,"1 and also by permitting the trustee of
the bankruptcy estate, which in reorganization cases may be the debtor itself,22
broad discretion in deciding which preferential transfers to avoid. These
inconsistencies contribute to problems with both carrying out and
legitimizing preference law. Exceptions-and the breadth of their scope-
open the door to litigation, imposing significant costs on the estate in its
efforts to pursue preferences.5 The availability of defenses also encourages
creditors to view preference law as an unfair imposition, rather than an
equitable inevitability. Departures from the theory of strict liability and
absolute equality of distribution belie the accepted underlying rationale for
preference actions. The difficulty in predicting when exceptions will protect
a transfer and when they will not also encourages the view that preference law
is arbitrary and capricious, despite its stated pursuit of equality.
The introduction of alternative bankruptcy policy goals justifies the
deviation from preference law's policy to strictly enforce equality of
distribution. These goals are the maximization of the debtor's estate for the
benefit of creditors4 and the continuation of the debtor as a going concern
for the benefit of non-creditor third parties.25 These two goals are frequently
2o. Note that the standard is not whether the transfer reduced the overall sum available to
other creditors, although many have argued that it should be. See infra note 51. Instead, the
standard is whether the transfer made it possible for one creditor to receive a higher pro rata
payment from the estate than it would have otherwise. See I I U.S.C. § 5 47 (b) (5 ) (2012). In other
words, it is irrelevant to equal distribution whether the preferred creditor added to the overall
estate prior to receiving the transfer.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). For example, the "ordinary course of business" exception tends
to protect creditors with whom the debtor has an ongoing, long-term relationship. See infra notes
1 1 1-19 and accompanying text. There is also an exception on behalf of recipients for domestic
support obligations. See s 1 U.S.C. § 547(c) (7).
22. See infra notes 185-88.
23. SeeCHARLESJoRDANTABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 52 4 (2d ed. 2009); see also Calton
& Gould, supra note 6, at 666, 669 (suggesting that trustees may be convinced to abandon or
settle cases for nominal payment where creditors' defense counsel can clearly articulate
defenses).
24. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: 2013 CASEBOOK
SUPPLEMENT 9 (6th ed. 2013) (noting that bankruptcy theorists all agree that a major goal of
bankruptcy is to preserve economic value, even in liquidation); Richard V. Butler & Scott M.
Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269,
270-71 (1994) (noting bankruptcy law is intended to overcome the "common pool" problem,
under which individual creditor collection rights could destroy part of the debtor's value for
other creditors); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization:
A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV.
973, 975 (1983) (stating the central assumption of bankruptcy reorganization is that an
enterprise will be more valuable as a going concern, and reorganization proceedings are
intended to preserve this additional value for the benefit of creditors).
25. This goal is substantially more controversial, and forms the basis for a significant division
among bankruptcy scholars. Compare, e.g., Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 24, at 281-82 (noting
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pursued under the guise of deterring aggressive creditor collection against
struggling debtors, an oft-stated secondary purpose for preference law.26 The
argument is that preference law is necessary to deter creditors from
inappropriately grabbing debtor assets in the days leading up to bankruptcy
(a "bad" preference), and on the flip side, to encourage creditors to continue
doing business with the debtor in the days leading up to bankruptcy (a "good"
preference).27 Viewed in this light, bankruptcy should encourage the
avoidance of bad preferences, but should leave good preferences in place.2S
In making this argument, policymakers often seem unaware of the
contradiction between the strict liability underlying the concept of equal
distribution and the intent-based justification for deterrence.29 Other
commentators have acknowledged the tension between the principle of equal
that a business' going concern value is only partly captured by the recovery it can provide for its
creditors, and also comprises relationships with non-creditor third parties, suggesting an
independent bankruptcy interest in preserving this value), and Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 787-89 (1987) (arguing that chapter 1 1 satisfies an important
policy interest in permitting the continuation of a debtor despite a creditor's interest in shutting
the business down, because other actors could have an interest in the debtor's ongoing survival),
with THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 24 (1986) (arguing that
bankruptcy law should be limited to concerns of how to maximize the value of a given pool of
assets, not to how those assets should be distributed), and Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (19 8 7) (arguing
that the rules determining loss distribution inside and outside bankruptcy should be the same,
suggesting no independent policy interest in the continuation of a failing debtor); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6i79.
26. See A. Ari Afilalo, The Impact of Union Bank v. Wolas on the Ordinary Course of Business
Defense to a Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 72 B.U. L. REv. 625, 635, 637 (1992) (explaining that the
ordinary course of business exception ultimately is aimed at deterrence, with the primary purpose
of "allowing a troubled debtor to pay its creditors and to continue its business activity"); Charles
Jordan Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REV. 981, 987 (1992) (stating that the result
supposedly achieved by deterrence is "maximization of the value of the debtor's assets").
27. SeeTabb, supra note 26, at 982-83.
28. See MichaelJ. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 54 7(c)(I),
(2) & (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 691-92 (1983) (arguing that trade
creditors who recognize a buyer's drift into bankruptcy but nonetheless continue to do business
with the debtor deserve significant protection from preference liability).
29. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 162 (1991) ("[Elven if we accept ... that the
availability of the ordinary business exception to long-term creditors does not directly further the
policy of equal treatment, we must recognize that it does further the policy of deterring the race
to the courthouse and, as the House Report recognized, may indirectly further the goal of equal
distribution as well."); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5874
(the general policy of preference law is deterring "unusual action" by the debtor or creditors);
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178 ("The operation of the preference section to deter 'the race of
diligence' of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of
the preference section-that of equality of distribution."); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178
("To argue that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a preference and that
creditors should not be required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore
the strong bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors.").
[Vol. 100: 5 1
2014] CONFLICTING PREFERENCES IN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 59
distribution and competing policies,3o and have argued for the promotion of
one over the other.s'
This Article argues that the policy goals associated with preference law-
equal distribution, estate maximization, and debtor survival-cannot be
satisfactorily balanced by a general preference law that is applicable across
chapters. Equal distribution, although it forms the underlyingjustification for
pursuing preferences in the first place, is consistently undermined by the
other important policies, particularly in the context of debtor reorganization.
To reconcile the two, the law has established a series of exceptions that eat
away at preference liability, until the original purpose is no longer clear or
defensible. Instead, preference actions in business bankruptcy cases32 should
be abandoned in the reorganization context, where equal distribution is
subordinate to more important policy goals, and returned to its originally
intended form in liquidation cases, where it can again promote equality
among all similarly situated creditors. The policy interest in ensuring equal
distribution is still powerful in the liquidation context. Removing exceptions
that interfere with this policy will both reduce costs and better harmonize this
policy with the broader bankruptcy goal of estate maximization.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I sets forth the law of
preferential transfers, its understood purpose or purposes, the basic standard
and exceptions set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, and an explanation for how
preference actions are pursued in the various bankruptcy chapters. Part II
evaluates the conflicting policies that inform preference proceedings and the
3o. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 3, at 78 ("The focus of preference law ... has not been
consistent."); John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67
VA. L. REV. 249, 252-53 (1981) ("The distinction between a deliberate preference that may be
recaptured and other transfers with preferential effect that are invulnerable does not mesh neatly
with the announced purpose of bankruptcy law to provide equal distribution among creditors.");
ThomasJ. Palazzolo, New Value and Preference Avoidance in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 875, 881,
883 (1991) (arguing that the new value exception was intended to encourage creditors to
continue to do business with a troubled debtor, but this policy undercuts the goal of equality of
distribution among creditors); Ponoroff, supra note 8, at 1450 (suggesting that "the lack of
coherence" in preference exceptions is symptomatic of confusion surrounding the basic
consequential objectives of preference law); Tabb, supra note 26, at 987 (noting that the two
policies of equality and deterrence "conflict at times").
31. See, e.g., Afilalo, supra note 26, at 635 ("The ultimate objective of preferences law is not
absolute equality."); Broome, supra note 3, at 79 ("Although a preference provision aimed only
at preventing inequality may incidentally deter the scramble for advantage, the Code reflects the
judgment that the deterrence objective should not limit the scope of the trustee's avoiding
power."); Tabb, supra note 26, at 987.
32. As explained below, this Article generally restricts itself to an analysis of preference law
in the business context, in connection with filings under chapter 7 and chapter 1 1, where it is
most likely to arise. See infra Part II.C. It should be noted that a different set of policy expectations
arises in the context of individual consumers; for example, there is no distinction in the
expectation of the individual debtor's survival post-bankruptcy, whether the case is one of
liquidation in chapter 7 or reorganization in chapter 13. In either scenario, policy is concerned
with the individual debtor's ability to function as a "going concern."
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exceptions thereto, particularly how the policies of estate maximization and
debtor survival as a going concern have shaped preference law and affected
equal distribution among creditors. Part III proposes abandoning traditional
preference avoidance in reorganization cases, and reestablishing a law of strict
and universal preference liability in liquidation cases. This Article is a thought
experiment, not a legislative proposal. It is intended to test the policy
justification behind the current legal structure, and suggest an alternative
direction.
I. PART ONE: THE LAW OF PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
As explained by Charles Tabb in his influential treatise on bankruptcy,
"[g] enerally speaking, a preference is a transfer that favors one creditor over
others."33 More specifically, a preference is a transfer in the period prior to a
bankruptcy filing (go days for general creditors, one year for insiders) that
makes the recipient better off than it would have been pursuant to a pro rata
distribution of the bankruptcy estate had the transfer never taken place.34
These transfers can be avoided or unwound, such that the value transferred
out of the bankruptcy estate is returned to satisfy estate creditors on a pro rata
basis. Its purpose is therefore to preserve the general theory of bankruptcy
that creditors should be treated equally, as long as they are similarly situated,
in the course of administrating a bankruptcy estate.35 The basic standard for
preferential transfers is strict liability for initial transferees,36 with closely
33. TABB, supra note 23, at 486.
34. See is U.S.C. § 5 4 7 (b) (2012).
35. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 49 (1978), repTinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835
("Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors
are treated equally."); Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation
of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 222 (2004) (identifying "equal treatment of similarly-
situated creditors" as one of the "oft-cited substantive goals of bankruptcy"); Charles Seligson,
The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 292, 292 (1967) ("A cornerstone of the bankruptcy structure is the principle that equal
treatment for those similarly situated must be achieved.").
36. See supra note 4. As others have pointed out, preference law was not always one of strict
liability; rather, historically, it more closely resembled the law of fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g.,
Vern Countryman, The Concept ofa Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 716-18
(1985); McCoid, supra note 3o, at 25o; Ponoroff, supra note 8, at 1448 n.2 1; Weisberg, supra note
l, at 4; see also Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 , § 6o(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978)
(declaring a preference avoidable only if the person receiving the transfer "shall have had
reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference"); Bankruptcy Act
of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878) (declaring void and avoidable transfers
made in contemplation of insolvency with a view to give a preference, with the existence of such
transfers made outside the usual and ordinary course of business prima facie evidence of fraud);
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843) (declaring void and
fraudulent all transfers of property made in contemplation of bankruptcy and for the purpose of
giving a preference). The decision to move away from the intent requirement was informed by
the 1973 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, [hereinafter
"1973 Report"] which indicated that the intent requirement was "the most troublesome feature"
of current preference provisions, leading to much litigation, and that "intention should be
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defined rules for its application and its exceptions. In theory, it applies to all
transfer recipients, regardless of culpable intent, financial need, or particular
status.37 However, as explained below, preference liability is subject to
important exceptions that discriminate between creditors pursuant to various
alternative policy objectives.
A. THE PURPOSE OFPREFERENCE LAW
1. Equal Distribution
The purpose of preferential transfers is tied up in the purposes of
bankruptcy law, and in particular, the distributional theory of bankruptcy.38
Assisted by the automatic stay, which prohibits creditors from collecting on
individual debts the moment a debtor files for bankruptcy,s9 bankruptcy law
forces creditors into a pro rata system of distribution.40 It does not permit
creditors to side-step bankruptcy procedures to obtain a greater proportion
of the bankruptcy estate than they would otherwise receive4' in liquidationo
or under a plan.43 Instead, with certain exceptions,44 creditors can only
irrelevant." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 214-15 (1973). "That [intent] requirement, more than any other, has
rendered ineffective the preference section of the present Act." Id. at 203-04.
37. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2oo6) (holding that sovereign
immunity is not a defense to a preferential transfer action).
38. See Weisberg, supra note 1, at 3 ("Preference doctrine would seem to be a central part
of bankruptcy law. If the general purpose of bankruptcy law is to ensure a ratable distribution of
the debtor's assets among the creditors, preference law would seem, by definition, to be a primary
instrument for achieving that goal.").
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (2012); see also Daniel Keating, Offensive Uses of the Bankruptcy Stay,
4 5 VAND. L. REV. 71, 75 (1992).
40. For a justification of bankruptcy's departure from rules rewarding a race of diligence
outside of bankruptcy, see Tabb, supra note 26, at 988.
41. See David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 211, 216.
42. Liquidation of a debtor's assets is generally accomplished through a chapter 7 filing, in
which an independent trustee is appointed to administer and distribute the estate. See generally
WILLIAM D. WARREN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 21 (9th ed. 2012).
43. Bankruptcy law also permits qualifying debtors to reorganize their affairs and make
payments on pre-petition debts pursuant to a bankruptcy plan, as overseen by the court. This is
typically accomplished in chapter 13 for individual consumer debtors, and in chapter 1 I for
businesses. Chapter 12 provides reorganization for family farmers or fishermen. See id. at 21-23.
44. The Bankruptcy Code has identified certain debts as nondischargeable, by nature of the
debt or in response to the bad actions of the debtor before or during the bankruptcy proceeding.
For example, many taxes and governmental fines are nondischargeable, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1),
(7), (14 A) and (14 B), as are debts obtained by fraud, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2), for fraud, see 11
U.S.C. § 523 (a) (4), for domestic support obligations, see I 1 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (5), and for willful torts,
see 1 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (6). Unless a debtor can demonstrate that not discharging student loans would
impose an undue hardship, such educational loans are also nondischargeable. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (8).
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recover from funds made available through the liquidation of the estate, or
the funds dedicated to repayment of creditors in a plan of reorganization.
But not all creditors are treated equally in bankruptcy. Creditors who
hold a security interest in estate assets or enjoy statutory priority status may be
paid in full while others receive nothing.45 However, there is a policy of
preserving equal treatment within classes of debtors, and in particular, among
non-priority unsecured creditors.46 Congress has explicitly stated this policy,47
and the Supreme Court has also recognized it,48 as have other members of the
judiciary.49 Bankruptcy scholars have also agreed that bankruptcy is intended
to promote equitable distribution,o even if they have different opinions about
what that means.5'
45. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text; see also ii U.S.C. § 507 (listing the priority
of expenses and claims). For a discussion on the history of wage priority in bankruptcy law, see
C. Scott Pryor, The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Perspectives on the Wage Priority in Bankruptcy, 16 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 121, 122 (2008).
46. See Countryman, supra note 36, at 748 (noting that, while the stated purpose behind
preference law in the legislative history is "equality of distribution," bankruptcy only promotes a
policy of preserving equality within classes); Edward S. Margolis, Advantage to Creditor:
UnderstandingPreference Actions and Available Defenses, 93 ILL. BJ. 590, 590-91 (2005) ("The power
to avoid preferences promotes the primary bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors by insuring that all creditors of the same class receive the same pro rata share of the
debtor's estate.").
47. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297
("Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors
are treated equally.").
48. See Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 451 (1937) (noting that "the object of
bankruptcy laws is the equitable distribution of the debtor's assets amongst his creditors."); Kothe
v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 28o U.S. 224, 227 (1930) ("The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to
bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among creditors holding just
demands based upon adequate consideration."); see also Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
394 F.3 d 1 198, 1203 (9 th Cir. 2005) (noting that, along with the fresh start, chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code encapsulates the ideal of equitable distribution of the debtor's assets "through
a distinctive form of collective proceeding").
49. See In reBrook Mays Music Co., No. o6-328s6-SGJ-i 1, 2007 WL 4960375, at *1 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2007) (criticizing avoidance actions that fail to take into consideration "the
underlying policies of the preference laws which, since Elizabethan times, have always been about
promoting equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors and deterring
overreaching").
5o. See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of
Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter ri Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 968; Richard B. Levin,
An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 184 (1979) ("Congress has
chosen to eliminate the reasonable-cause-to-believe test from the ordinary preference situation.
The goal of equality of distribution among creditors becomes paramount."); Palazzolo, supra note
3o , at 877; Seligson, supra note 35, at 292 ("A cornerstone of the bankruptcy structure is the
principle that equal treatment for those similarly situated must be achieved.").
51. For example, some see the purpose of equal distribution to ensure that no creditor is
paid less as a consequence of a preferential transfer, although this is not the statutory standard.
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 215 ("It may be thought that the core meaning of the entire
preference concept is that the transfers which should be avoided are those which, if allowed to
stand, would leave the estate available for distribution among creditors permanently depleted. If,
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Preference law is a necessary extension of the normal bankruptcy
restrictions on distribution that would give one creditor more than it gives
another.52 It creates a look-back period of 90 days to ensure that the pro rata
bankruptcy distribution will not be rendered moot by a disbursement of assets
immediately before filing.5s This concern that debtor or creditor activity
immediately prior to a bankruptcy filing could undermine any subsequent
bankruptcy distribution predates any codified preference law in the United
States. Under the 18oo Bankruptcy Act, for example, courts inferred
principles of preference doctrine from the existence of a bankruptcy law, with
its strict principle of ratable distribution.4 Even further back, English law
recognized actions relating to preferential transfers in the late 16th century,
justifying such actions on account of "a distrust of a bankrupt's handling of
his own assets and a principle of equal division among creditors."5
Because the purpose of preference law is to ensure equal distribution,
and not to punish bad actors,56 the standard is strict liability: "Any creditor
that received a greater payment than others of his class is required to disgorge
so that all may share equally,"57 regardless of the creditor's intent or influence
in causing the preferential treatment. In fact, preference actions will typically
only be used when the transfer was valid, the debt legitimately taken, and
payment justifiably due. Transfers made without adequate compensation, or
for the purpose of defrauding creditors, will provoke a fraudulent conveyance
action, rather than a preference proceeding.s5 In preference law, the only
in a series of transactions between the (bankrupt) transferor and a transferee, the 'net result' is
zero (i.e. no depletion), it seems unfair to penalize the transferee by holding each separate
'transfer' preferential without crediting him for the subsequent unsecured new value
contributions he has made to the estate."); see also Palazzolo, supra note 3 o , at 876.
52. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 178 ("[Tlhe preference provisions facilitate the prime
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor."); Broome, supra
note 3, at 113; Rafael I. Pardo, On Proof of Preferential Effect, 55 ALA. L. REv. 281, 2 82 (2004) ("If
the Code is to be applied equally to similarly situated creditors, 'preferential transfers' must be
defeated.").
53. See Countryman, supra note 36, at 748 ("The function of the preference concept is to
avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of distribution."); McCoid, supra
note 3 o , at 26o-61 ("Preference law tries to impose equality on pre-bankruptcy behavior so that
that behavior will not make the principle of equality in bankruptcy distribution meaningless.");
Weisberg, supra note 1, at 4 ("Bankruptcy law empowers the trustee and the court to enforce
ratable distribution as a matter of public power; preference law implies that the debtor and
creditor have a private duty to save the bankruptcy process from becoming moot before it has a
chance to start.").
54. See Weisberg, supra note i, at 76.
55. See id. at 40-41 (citing The Case of Bankrupts, ( 584) 76 Eng. Rep. 441,473 (KB.)).
56. See Countryman, supra note 36, at 748.
57. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 178.
58. Recipients of transfers that are constructively fraudulent, in which there is no evidence
of fraudulent intent, but the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the transfer, may also be innocent of any wrongdoing. Accordingly, an argument could be
made that avoidance proceedings in the context of such fraudulent conveyances under 11 U.S.C.
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violation is the timing of the payment:59 if made during the go days before
bankruptcy, it may be avoided.
2. Deterrence
Many also view preference law as a method to discourage creditors' over-
hasty efforts to dismantle a struggling debtor, the proverbial "race to the
courthouse." 60 This policy, when interpreted broadly, tends to conflict with
the principle goal of equal distribution.6 , The underlying justification of
deterrence is to encourage the debtor's continued financial stability. This
echoes both the desire to maximize the debtor's estate and to preserve the
debtor's continuing operation as a going concern. When a debtor faces a
financial downturn, creditors may justifiably fear for their prospects of
repayment, prompting attempts to recover ahead of the rest of the pack. This
behavior can only harm the debtor's financial position and may encourage a
bankruptcy filing. However, the reasoning goes, if a creditor knows that last-
minute efforts to recover may eventually be avoided in bankruptcy, the
creditor will be more inclined to refrain from collecting, permitting the
debtor space and opportunity to regain its financial footing. If this happens,
all creditors will benefit and the matter will be resolved without the
interference of the bankruptcy court.
The purpose of deterrence in preference law is generally understood to
be subordinate to the primary purpose of ensuring equal distribution.62 This
§ 548 (a) () (B) are also unfair and should be done away with. Such an argument is outside the
scope of this Article; however, it should be noted that fraudulent conveyance law does not suffer
from the internal inconsistencies described here. The law regarding fraudulent conveyances,
even transfers that are only constructively fraudulent, is intended to and largely succeeds in
maximizing the debtor's estate for the benefit of creditors by avoiding transfers in which the
debtor has given value without receiving value in return. See CHARLESJoRDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY 570 ( 3 d ed. 2014) ("The focus is not on the rights of creditors vis-a-vis other
creditors, as is true of preference law, but on the rights of creditors vis-a-vis the debtor.").
59. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
6o. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 177-78 ("[B]y permitting the trustee to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy."). As suggested below, there has been some historic disagreement, still largely
unresolved, as to whether deterrence is less important, as important, or even more important a
policy consideration to preference law than equality of distribution. See REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. NO. 93-137, at 202
0973) (listing "three distinct goals" for preference in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898: "First, it
lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for advantage; second, it promotes equality;
and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise loans in order to obtain a preferential
payment or security").
61. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
62. See Broome, supra note 3, at 115 (finding that after 1978, the main goal of preference
law was to preserve equality of distribution, with deterrence only an incidental objective); Carlson,
supra note 41, at 216 ("[V]oidable preference law is singularly unconnected with going concern
value."); Pardo, supra note 52, at 283; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 177-78 ("The purpose of
the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers
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may be due to the weakness of preference law as an effective deterrent. As
others have noted,6s a creditor has nothing to lose and everything to gain, by
accepting or demanding a preferential payment. In the first place, even if the
debtor is struggling financially at the time of the transfer, there is no
guarantee that the transfer will push the debtor into bankruptcy. The decision
to file for bankruptcy is complicated and strategic; often a debtor may avoid
bankruptcy even if circumstances would otherwise justify a filing.64 Even if the
debtor does go into bankruptcy within the preference period following the
transfer, there is no guarantee that the debtor will pursue an action because
of the potential costs of the action and the potential damage to the debtor's
relationship with the transferee. 65 Finally, even if a preferential action is
brought, the transferee may be able to argue that one of the exceptions
applies, which will at the very least raise the costs of pursuing the action and
thereby discourage the trustee from pushing for ajudgment.66
The policy of deterrence encourages exceptions for transfers that
promote economic activity between debtor and creditor. Put another way,
that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the
courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.... Second, and more
important, the preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of
distribution among creditors of the debtor."); Tabb, supra note 26, at 987 (arguing that concerns
of equal distribution "should be given ascendency" over concerns of deterrence).
63. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 41, at 216; Countryman, supra note 36, at 748.
64. See Michael Feder, How About Bankruptcy? Uh, No: Why It's Not the Best Solution, 15 BuS. L.
TODAY 19, 19 (2006) (discussing concerns of control, oversight, and expense). Similarly, filing
for bankruptcy can be used as a strategic tool to achieve specific business purposes. See KEVINJ.
DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTcY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO
THEIRADVANTAGE 59 (1992).
65. See Adelphia Comm. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In reAdelphia Commc'ns Corp.), 330
B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Debtors sometimes lack the inclination, or the means, to
bring actions that should be prosecuted. They sometimes have higher priorities, or are distracted
by other things. They sometimes have a practical need to avoid confrontation with entities like
their secured lenders, because they need those entities' continuing cooperation-as, for
example, in connection with exit financing."); Nancy Haller, Comment, Cybergenics 11: Precedent
and Policy vs. Plain Meaning, 56 ME. L. REV. 365, 384-85 (2004) ("A debtor-in-possession... may
use the trustee provisions to favor certain creditors; may be unwilling to avoid transactions with a
supplier or lender with whom it hopes to continue a business relationship after a successful
reorganization; or may have developed friendships that make it difficult to choose to pursue
actions with severe economic impacts."); Alan R. Lepene & Sean A. Gordon, The Case forDerivative
Standing in Chapter ii: "It's the Plain Meaning Stupid," 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 313, 317-18
(2003) ("DIPs frequently face conflicts where the duty to investigate and prosecute avoidance
claims may involve family members, major shareholders whose support they may need post-
reorganization, or current and past officers, directors, or other corporate insiders.").
66. In some situations, a trustee may be held liable for sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule
9o 1 if the trustee brought a preference action without adequately investigating the availability
of an affirmative defense. SeeIn reExcello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 1 109, 1112 (7 th Cir. 1992) (ruling
that at times a trustee may have a responsibility to examine whether any obvious affirmative
defenses bar the case); Goldberg, supra note 12 (citing ethical reasons why a practitioner should
not commence a preference action where there may be meritorious affirmative defenses);
Margolis, supra note 46, at 592.
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these exceptions permit some types of preferential transfers, but not others.
The recipients of "good" preferential transfers are therefore better off than
their fellow creditors, particularly those who received "bad," and therefore
avoidable, preferences. A true policy of equality would avoid all transfers,
whether "good" or "bad." The policy of deterrence accordingly conflicts with
the policy of equal distribution.
B. ELEMEN[S AND EXCEPTIONS
The elements of an avoidable preference, as defined by the Bankruptcy
Code, require a transfer of the debtor's property to a creditor, on account of
a previous debt, made during the 90 days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, such that the creditor received more than it would have under a
bankruptcy liquidation and distribution of the debtor's assets. The definition
of "transfer" is intentionally broad; it includes straightforward transactions,
such as cashing a check, and complicated transactions, such as the late
perfection of a security interest granted months prior.67 The remaining
requirements, separated into five subsections, are carefully worded to
minimize the litigation that follows many preference actions.
These five requirements are: (1) that the transfer be made "to or for the
benefit of a creditor";68 (2) that the transfer be "on account of an antecedent
debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made"; (3) that the transfer
be made "while the debtor was insolvent"; (4) that the transfer be made within
the 90 days before the date of the filing or between go days and one year prior
to the filing, if the creditor is an insider; and (5) that the transfer "enables
such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if' the transfer
had not been made and the estate distributed according to the rules of a
chapter 7 liquidation 69 To the extent that these elements require further
narrowing or clarification, the Bankruptcy Code cabins their scope through
exceptions7o and establishes a rebuttable presumption for insolvency during
67. Title 1' of the United States Code [hereinafter, the "Bankruptcy Code"], includes in
the definition of "transfer" the following:
the creation of a lien;
the retention of title as a security interest;
the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption; or
each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with-
property; or
an interest in property.
ls U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012).
68. Pursuant to this language, preferences may be direct or indirect. See TABB, supra note
58, at 5o6.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 7 (b).
7o . Exceptions are discussed infra Parts II.B. 1-2.
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the 9o-day preference period.7' Further, bankruptcy courts use a straight-
forward analysis to determine whether a creditor is made better off by virtue
of the transfer: where the subject creditor is unsecured and without priority,
the trustee must only show that the creditor would have received less than a
ioo% payout under the estate distribution.7
Despite efforts to simplify the rules of preferential transfers, preferences
are by far the most litigated of the avoidance powers exercised by the trustee.73
Much of the litigation surrounding preference law deals with the exceptions
to the rule. There are two types of exceptions: those that are intended to
clarify and narrow the parameters of what constitutes a preference
("narrowing exceptions"), and those that seek to carve out particular creditors
or transfers as protected from otherwise applicable preference law ("true
exceptions"). There are four narrowing exceptions to the law of preferential
transfers and seven true exceptions. Each is described briefly below.
i. Narrowing Exceptions
a. Substantially Contemporaneous Exchange
The first of the narrowing exceptions is the exception for transfers
constituting a "substantially contemporaneous exchange."74 This provision
recognizes the possibility that parties intending to engage in a simultaneous
transaction may inadvertently introduce some delay between the delivery of
goods and payment. For example, the debtor may elect to purchase goods
from a local vendor, intending to pay for those goods the same day. He may
load the goods into his truck, and then write a check to the vendor
representing payment. The vendor will accept the check and cash it the next
morning.75 Although both parties intended payment to be rendered
simultaneously to receipt of the goods, there may be a delay of some hours
during which, it can be argued, a debt was owed to the vendor on account of
the previous delivery of goods. Under preference policy, to the extent this
delay was not intended to establish a line of credit and is limited in time, it is
not made on account of an antecedent debt.76 This is because preference
policy is concerned with maintaining equality among creditors, not
71. 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 7 (f).
72. See Savage & Assocs. v. Mandl (In re Teligent Inc.), 38o B.R 324, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2oo8); Countryman, supra note 36, at 736-37.
73. See TABB, supra note 23, at 486. Other avoidance powers include a trustee's "strong arm"
powers, to act as a lien creditor, see 11 U.S.C. § 544, the ability to avoid the fixing of a statutory
lien, 11 U.S.C. § 545, the ability to avoid fraudulent transfers, 1 1 U.S.C. § 548, and the ability to
avoid setoff during what is effectively the preference period, Is U.S.C. § 553.
74. See i U.S.C. § 547(c)(1).
75. The legislative history suggests that this exception was written with bank checks in mind.
See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 7 (b) (2).
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unwinding business transactions with the debtor.77 If the debtor does not
intend for the transferee to become a creditor,78 the transferee has no
intention of extending credit,79 and the exchange itself was in fact
substantially contemporaneous, o then preference policy has no interest in
that transfer.8,
b. Purchase Money Security Interest
The second narrowing exception also deals with the concept of a transfer
on account of an antecedent debt. Preference law preserves the creation of a
valid purchase money security interest from preference liability,8 ' when the
loan was given and in fact used by the debtor to acquire new property and the
security interest was properly perfected within 30 days of the debtor receiving
possession.83 Understanding this exception requires understanding the
different treatment of secured and unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy policy has long recognized the priority treatment of creditors who
have obtained a security interest in collateral. The general admonition that
similarly situated creditors should be treated similarly4 in bankruptcy
recognizes dissimilarity between secured and unsecured creditors, and
accordingly allows secured creditors particular benefits associated with their
security interest. Properly secured and perfected creditors are not subject to
the rules regarding pro rata distribution that bind unsecured creditors.8 5
Instead, they retain their security interest through the bankruptcy.8 6 In
addition, a secured creditor may be entitled to a lifting of the automatic stay8 7
or to interim payments before final distribution of an asset to preserve its
interest in that asset.88
To receive the benefits of a security interest in bankruptcy, however, a
secured creditor must adhere to all relevant requirements of attachment and
77. See Broome, supra note 3, at 1 14.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 7(c)(1)(A).
79- Id.
8o. Id. § 5 4 7(c)()(B).
81. This exception may trace its roots to observation of the 1973 Report that the Act at that
time provided no guidance to when a debt became "antecedent," observing that "even a delay of
a few minutes may result in a debt being antecedent." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCYLAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt.1, at 205 (1973).
82. Generally speaking, a purchase money security interest (PMSI) is a security interest
taken or retained by the seller of collateral to secure the collateral's purchase price. See U.C.C.
§ 9-103(b) (2013).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (3).
84. See supra note 35.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 5o6(a).
86. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 619-21,
(1886).
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 3 62(d).
88. See id. § 361 (providing three methods of adequate protection); Rogers, supra note 24,
at 977-78.
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perfection of that interest. Otherwise, the trustee may avoid the creditor's
interest in the collateral by virtue of the trustee's strong arm powers,8 9 and the
secured creditor will be treated as if it were unsecured. In other words, a
creditor must have fully transformed under the law from being similarly
situated to other unsecured creditors (who must rely on normal processes of
execution and judgment for satisfaction in case of default), to being similarly
situated to other secured creditors (with full rights of repossession,
foreclosure, and priority). In addition, if the debtor grants an unsecured
creditor a security interest such that the creditor becomes a secured creditor
within the preference period, that grant can be avoided.o The advantages
conferred by a change in status from an unsecured creditor to a secured
creditor are recognized as a "transfer"9' that improves a creditor's position vis-
A-vis other similarly situated creditors, and if those advantages are conferred
on behalf of an antecedent debt,92 they are clearly preferential.
General concerns of preferring one (unsecured) creditor over another
for the purposes of equal distribution do not apply in cases where a security
interest is granted at the time the debtor receives new value from the creditor
for the purpose of acquiring the collateral.93 This is a narrowing of the
preference rule rather than a true exception, under the theory that a creditor
who gives value to become secured in collateral has never actually made a
transition from an unsecured creditor to a secured creditor, representing an
improvement in position. Instead, the creditor has, in theory, always been
secured,94 based on both parties' intent and their actual conduct, which
undermines the concept that the attachment of the security interest
constituted a transfer on account of an "antecedent" debt, and the concept
that the creditor was "preferred" as a consequence of the attachment.95
c. Floating Lien
The third narrowing exception deals with the definition of "transfer" in
the context of a security agreement in inventory, receivables, or their
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 544.
90. Id. § 5 4 7(b).
91. Id. § 101 (54) (A).
92. Id. § 5 4 7 (b).
93. Id. § 547(c)().
94. This assumes that the creditor successfully perfects its lien within the applicable time
period. If not, the transaction is subject to avoidance by the trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544
and/or § 547.
95. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 207-o8 (recommending the establishment an exception for so-called
"enabling loans" where the acquisition of the debtor's property arises later in time than the
advance of the loan, so that the transfer of a security interest is technically for an antecedent
debt). There is also an argument to be made for the PMSI exception from the perspective of
deterrence. Presumably, extension of the loan enabled the debtor to obtain the collateral,
thereby increasing the value of the estate.
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proceeds,96 commonly referred to as a "floating lien." The exception defines
transfer more narrowly to include only transactions that cumulatively create a
net improvement of position for the creditor during the course of the
preference period.97 This narrowing may be intended to simplify calculating
a preference in such situations as well as to avoid the improvement of a
particular creditor's situation.98 The rule also promotes the similar treatment
of creditors with a security interest in inventory or accounts receivables
compared to creditors that take security interests in other property.
Generally speaking, the appreciation of collateral during the preference
period is not a preferential transfer, even if all other elements have been
met.99 This is because general appreciation by virtue of market forces is not
recognized as a "transfer" under preference law.,°° However, the value of
inventory or accounts receivables will change over time as a consequence of
additions and reductions in the normal course of business, rather than simple
appreciation. For example, companies may invest in inventory during a
particular season, or increase sales and put off collection such that accounts
receivables will swell. To the extent that creditors with an interest in inventory
or receivables are undersecured at the beginning of the preference period,
and therefore would receive more on account of an increase in inventory or
receivables than they would otherwise in chapter 7,10' the increase represents
a preference to the creditor that may be avoided.
However, the definition of avoidable transfer stated in the Code, without
the narrowing exception, could include those transactions associated with
normal turnover in inventory and accounts receivables. Unlike an interest in
real estate or equipment, for example, an interest in inventory is presumed to
involve near-constant turnover. The pieces of inventory in which a creditor is
96. 11 U.S.C.§547(c)(5).
97. SeeTABB, supranote 23, at 551.
98. H. REP. No. 95-595, at 214-16 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6176
(indicating that the rule is intended "to avoid complicated and expensive litigation by focusing
the judicial inquiry on the situation as it existed on the two dates chosen as measuring points").
99. For example, suppose Creditor A has a security interest in the debtor's equipment,
which is worth $400,ooo at the beginning of the preference period, but swells in value to
$8oo,ooo by the end of the preference period, the time of the debtor's bankruptcy filing.
Suppose further that Creditor A's claim against the debtor was $6oo,ooo at all relevant times, and
that the debtor's estate will not pay its unsecured creditors in full. Had it not been for the
appreciation in the equipment's value, Creditor A would have received $400,000 for its security
interest and a pro rata distribution for the remaining $2oo,ooo. Accordingly, the appreciation
has made Creditor A better off than it would have been without chapter 7. See i1 U.S.C.
§ 547(b) (5). Despite this, the equipment's appreciation in value is not considered a "transfer"
recognized under preference law; accordingly the trustee cannot avoid Creditor A's interest in
the equipment.
too. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Leb. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 35 B.R. 789, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983);
In re Nivens, 22 B.R. 287, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). But see Carlson, supra note 41, at 241
(noting alternative positions regarding the increase in value of collateral over time).
Los. See supra note 96.
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secured at the beginning of the preference period are highly unlikely to
remain in a debtor's inventory by the end of the preference period. Instead,
they will have been replaced with new inventory as the old inventory was sold.
Without this narrowing definition, preference law would treat the attachment
of a security interest in each new piece of inventory obtained during the
preference period as an avoidable transfer, and an improvement to the
creditor's position made on account of an antecedent debt.
The Bankruptcy Code does not allow a trustee to avoid transfers that
create a perfected security interest in inventory or receivables-except to the
extent that the transfers in the aggregate made the creditor better off at the
end of the preference period than it was at the beginning of the preference
period. °2 This is the "two-point net improvement test":1o3 the Bankruptcy
Code looks at the creditor's position at the beginning of the relevant
preference period,°4 and then compares it with the creditor's position at the
end of the preference period. To the extent that a creditor has less unsecured
debt at the end of the preference period than it had at the beginning of the
preference period,'°5 that amount of improvement may be avoided by the
trustee.
d. Transfers for the Benefit of an Insider
The final narrowing exception is in a separate subsection, and addresses
the preference period, particularly for transfers to insiders.v o6 In the
Bankruptcy Code, the general preference period is 90 days prior to the date
of the bankruptcy petition.07 But where the creditor/transferee is an insider,
the preference period is expanded to one year.- s Insider status is given to
relatives of individual debtors, directors, officers, or partners of corporate
debtors, and those with similar connections.°9 The Code distinguishes
insiders from general unsecured creditors, much as secured creditors are
distinguished, except that insiders are targeted for less favorable treatment,
not more. Likewise, insiders or equity holders of a corporate debtor are
generally placed further down in the order of repayment, " 0 reflecting both
102. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5).
103. See TABB, supra note 23, at 551.
104. See i U.S.C. § 547(c) (5) (A) (providing either go days for general creditors or one year
for insiders).
105. Secured creditors receive payment in full in bankruptcy for the portion of their claims
that is secured by collateral. To the extent their claims exceed the value of the collateral, the
remaining debt is treated the same as all other unsecured debt, and is paid out according to the
same pro rata distribution. See id. § 5o6(a) (1).
io6. Id. § 5 4 7 (i).
107. Id. § 54 7 (b) (4) (A).
1o8. Id. § 5 4 7 (b) (4) (B).
iog. See id.§ 101(31).
110. Seeid.§§726(a), 112 9 (b).
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the risky nature of their investment and the attitude that those who control
the company should bear the greatest responsibility for its failure."
The narrowing exception related to the insider time frame simply
clarifies the target of transfer avoidance. Because avoidable transfers may be
made "to or for the benefit of a creditor,"- it is possible for a transfer to a
non-insider to be made for the benefit of an insider. Such a transfer would be
avoidable under preference law. The exception merely clarifies that it is
avoided only with respect to the insider, and not with respect to the non-
insider transferee, reflecting the different, more stringent treatment given
insiders under preference law than that given general creditors.
2. True Exceptions
In contrast to these narrowing exceptions, which clarify or refine the
equal distribution goal of preference law, there are also exceptions that
further distinct policies. These exceptions aim to protect specific types of
creditors and to encourage behavior among creditors that will assist, or at least
not undermine, a struggling debtor.
a. Ordinay Course
The first of these "true" exceptions is the "ordinary course" exception,,3
which is responsible for an extraordinary amount of the litigation
surrounding preference law. Nearly three-quarters of all preference cases
involve an ordinary course defense,, 14 and such a defense is often sufficient to
at least take the case past summary judgment."5 More than the other true
exceptions, and perhaps much more based on the litigation impact, this
exception undermines the stated purpose of preference law in pursuit of an
alternative goal.
Under this exception, the trustee cannot avoid a transfer to the extent
that the debt was incurred "in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor," and repaid "in the ordinary course of business" or
111. See John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and
Bankruptcy---Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's
Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 263 (1973) (noting "the normal expectation that equity
investment and junior debt will bear the first losses of the enterprise").
112. 11 U.S.C.§ 54 7(b)(i).
113. Seeid.§547(c)(2).
114. Amer. Bank. Inst. Task Force on Preferences, ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY (May 1997), http://
www.abiworld.org/legis/reform/preferencesurvey.html; see alsojoseph M. Mulvihill, The Ordinary
Course of Business Defense in Bankruptcy Preference Actions: Methods of Comparison, 38 DEL.J. CORP. L.
637, 638 (2013) (noting that the ordinary course of business defense is one of the most
inconsistent and unsettled areas of preference litigation); Tabb, supra note 26, at 1032 ("The
main issue in almost every preference case involving trade creditors is the application of section
547 (c) (2).).
115. TABB, supranote 23, at 524.
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"according to ordinary business terms."" 6 The breadth of the exception,
particularly on what constitutes "ordinary," encourages its use as a defense in
preference actions."7 Interpreted broadly enough, it threatens to swallow the
rule of preferences." 8 The exception's boundaries have proved notoriously
difficult to define., 19
The stated purpose for the ordinary course exception was "to leave
undisturbed normal financial relations,",-- so as not to force a debtor into
bankruptcy prematurely. The advocates of this exception explained the
rationale behind its inclusion as if the policy behind preference actions was
to encourage the financial survival of the debtor pre-bankruptcy, observing
that "it does not detract from the general policy of the preference section to
discourage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors during the
debtor's slide into bankruptcy." 2- This perspective fails to recognize the
stated underlying policy of preference law, equal distribution among
creditors, and instead introduces a separate, if also laudable goal:
encouraging a pre-bankruptcy debtor's ongoing survival, both for its own sake
and to maximize the creditor payout. This conflict explains the difficulty in
preference law of attempting to satisfy what is presumed to be a unified, or at
least ajoint policy, but actually reflects competing goals.22
116. i U.S.C.§ 5 4 7(c)(2).
117. TABB, supra note 23, at 524 ("The ordinary course exception breeds and feeds
litigation."); Katz et al., supra note 3, at 11 ("The need to retain conflicting experts on 'ordinary
course' defenses is an expense for both sides to the dispute. These costs are difficult, if not
impossible, to recover.").
118. See Margolis, supra note 46, at 592 (observing that the 2005 amendment provide that
only exceptionally idiosyncratic dealings will fall outside the broad range of transactions under
the ordinary course exception); Tabb, supra note 26, at 986 (noting the ordinary course
exceptions "swallows up any realistic supposition that equality matters").
119. See, e.g., Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494, 497--98 (8th Cir. 1991)
("'[Tihere is no precise legal test which can be applied' in determining whether payments by the
debtor during the go-day period were 'made in the ordinary course of business'; 'rather, th[e]
court must engage in a 'peculiarly factual analysis."' (alternation in original) (quoting In re
Fulghum Constr. Corp., 872 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989)); NEIL STEINKAMP &JAKE REED,
UNDERSTANDING ORDINARY: A PRIMER ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE
ORDINARY COURSE DEFENSES TO BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCE ACTIONS 18-19 (2013) (listing various
comments from recent court rulings regarding the definition of "ordinary business terms").
120. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874; H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 373 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329.
121. Id.
122. C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of llusory Events,
45 ARK. L. REV. 265, 277 (1992) ("Preference law has always had difficulty distinguishing between
preferential transactions which should be avoided and those which should be permitted to stand.
In theory, transfers induced by the expectation or fear of an imminent bankruptcy should be
avoided; but transfers in the ordinary course of business should stand, even though the debtor
was insolvent and the creditor received more than it would have in an ensuing bankruptcy.").
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b. New Value
The second of the true exceptions is the new value exception,-3 which
provides that a creditor's provision of subsequent and unsecured new value
(additional loans, services, credit, or release of property)124 forgives a prior
preferential transfer, up to the amount of the new value. The timing here is
essential-the creditor must have given new value after such transfer, and the
creditor cannot have been reimbursed on account of such new value.,25 The
creditor cannot argue, for example, that the court should look to the "net
result" of all transfers during the preference period between the debtor and
creditor.12 6 The purpose of the new value exception is not to determine
whether or not the creditor has provided credit, goods, or services in
exchange for the debtor's transfer-it is presumed that there was an
antecedent debt justifying the receipt of the transfer. Instead, the creditor
must show that the debtor's estate was subsequently replenished by the
creditor following the avoidable transfer. Under the terms of the exception,
the creditor may keep the portion of the avoidable transfer for which it has
subsequently provided new value.! 27
The justification for the new value exception is similar to that underlying
the ordinary course exception,128 and comprises the flip side of the
deterrence policy associated with preference law. More than simply deterring
a race to the courthouse, both exceptions seek to encourage ongoing
commercial relations between creditors and debtors. Beyond discouraging
creditors from insisting on payment when the debtor appears to be flagging,
the new value exception, in particular, seeks to reward creditors who extend
123. Seeii U.S.C.§547(c)(4) (2012).
124. "New value" is defined in 1' U.S.C. § 547(a)(2).
125. iU.S.C. § 5 4 7(c)( 4 )(B).
126. See TABB, supra note 23, at 544; Harris P. Quinn, The Subsequent New Value Exception Under
Section 547 (c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code-Judicial Gloss Is Creditors'Loss, 24 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV.
667, 670-75 (1994).
127. A comparison of factual examples may be useful here. Suppose the preference period
runs fromJanuary 1 to March 31. OnJanuary i, Creditor is owed $400,ooo by the Debtor. Debtor
transfers $1oo,ooo to Creditor on February 1. On March 1, the Creditor supplies Debtor with
$8o,ooo of new value, in the form of additional credit. Under preference law, the $ioo,ooo
transfer from the Debtor to the Creditor is avoidable. However, under the new value exception,
$8o,ooo of that transfer will not be avoided on account of the Creditor's extension of additional
credit. Instead, the Creditor will be liable to the estate for only $20,000.
In contrast, assume that under the same factual scenario, with creditor owed the underlying
debt of $400,ooo as ofJanuary i, Creditor extends an additional $8o,ooo of credit on February
i. On March i, Debtor transfers $ ioo,ooo to Creditor. In this situation, Creditor will be liable to
the estate for the entire $1oo,ooo, with no regard for Creditor's previous extension of additional
credit. Although the Creditor extended the same dollar amount of "new value" as in the first
scenario, it was not extended subsequent to the avoidable transfer, and therefore falls outside of
the new value exception.
128. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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the debtor new credit in the days leading up to bankruptcy.129 The new value
exception acts as a form of absolution for creditors who have received a
preferential transfer, so long as the value was given after the transfer. Like the
ordinary course exception, it identifies "good" creditors as those who obtain
their preference in the course of assisting the debtor's business, as opposed
to "bad" creditors who obtain a preference ostensibly by overreaching. In this
way, the exception undermines the notion that preference law is one of strict
liability, unaffected by notions of fairness or creditor worthiness, and instead,
recognizes a difference in creditor position based on the preferred creditor's
past generosity, or lack thereof, to the debtor.,so
c. Statutory Lien
The third of the true exceptions, like many that follow, reflects a distinct
policy preference unrelated to the policy of equal distribution or the goal of
deterring creditor overreach. This exception protects statutory liens from
preference liability to the extent they are not avoidable by virtue of a trustee's
power in a separate subsection.',' Although Congress elected to override
some statutory liens by virtue of the bankruptcy power,3 2 it leaves others
untouched, preserved both from the trustee's ability to avoid statutory liens
generally and from preference law. This is a straight-forward policy decision:
statutory liens that do not fall under the categories Congress has defined take
priority over the bankruptcy policies that would have avoided them. ,33
129. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. NO. 93-137, Pt. I, at 210 ("This provision is designed to promote fairness to preferred
creditors and also to encourage new credit.").
13o . The new value exception can trace its roots to a period in which preference law was not
one of strict liability. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6o(c), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978)
(permitting a preferred creditor who subsequently in good faith gives the debtor further credit
to set off the amount of new credit against the otherwise recoverable preference). Recent
developments in the Third Circuit have raised a debate as to the purpose of the new value
exception, particularly whether the court was correct in determining that the exception embodies
the goal of deterrence over equality. SeeJoseph L. Steinfeld, Jr. & Kara E. Casteel, Critical-Vendor
Creditors May Now Double-Dip on New Value, AM. BANKR. INST.J., March 2014, at 48 (noting that the
court's analysis in Friedman's Liquidating Trust v. Roth Staffing Cos. (In reFriedman's, Inc.), 738 F. 3 d
547 (3 d Cir. 2013), was incorrect in ignoring the policy of equal distribution among creditors
and instead treating one similarly-situated creditor better than others); Jeffrey R. Waxman,
Petition Date Fixes Amount of Defendant's Subsequent New Value, AM. BANKR. INST.J., March 2014, at
46 (noting that In re Friedman's Inc. reached the correct result in promoting the debtor's ability
to reorganize on a going-concern basis).
131. SeeliU.S.C.§ 5 4 7(c)(6) (2012).
132. See id. § 545. Avoidable liens include those that first become effective by virtue of a
bankruptcy filing or condition of insolvency, as well as those that are unenforceable against a
bona fide purchaser. Statutory liens for rent are also avoidable. Id.
133. Examples of unavoidable statutory liens include a producer's liens on partially
processed grapes, In re Loretto Winery Ltd., 898 F.2d 715, 718-19, 724 (9 th Cir. 199o), farmers'
liens on grain deposited in a grain elevator, In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 184 B.R. 52, 58 (S.D. Ind.
1995), affd sub nomn Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc., 93 F-3 d 1347 (7 th Cir. i996), and wage
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d. Domestic Support Obligations'34
Consistent with other sections of the Bankruptcy Code that prioritize
payment of domestic support obligations'35 and make them nondischargeable
in bankruptcy,s 6 transfers constituting a bona fide payment of a domestic
support obligation debt are not avoidable in bankruptcy.'37 The rationale
behind this exception is not related to the policy of equal distribution or the
goals of deterrence policy. Instead, it is likely motivated by the difficult
situation faced by domestic support recipients, a desire to assist such
recipients to the extent feasible, and a hearty distaste for clawing back funds
from women and children for the sake of the bankruptcy distribution. s8
e. Monetay Floors
The Bankruptcy Code has also established monetary floors on the
amount of a transfer that the trustee may pursue in a preference proceeding.
In consumer cases, a trustee may not avoid a transfer of less than $6oo.1s9 In
all other cases, a transfer must have an aggregate value of at least $6225.14 °
These amounts could be said to clarify the definition of "transfer," by
introducing a monetary floor. They also introduce a distinct policy
consideration. Arguably, this exception is intended to reduce costs to the
estate in cases where the amounts are too trifling to justify the effort,
promoting a policy of cost-effectiveness in bankruptcy administration.,41 More
likely, however, given the discretion inherent in a trustee's decision to pursue
a preference claim4, and the presumption that the trustee will perform a cost-
earners' liens, In reNapco GraphicArts, Inc., 51 B.R. 757, 764 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985), affd inpart,
rev'd in part sub nom. In re Napco Graphic Arts, Inc., 83 B.R. 558 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
134. Note that this exception is unlikely to arise with any frequency in the business context.
It is included here for the sake of comprehensive treatment regarding the preference exceptions.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a).
136. Id.§52 3 (a)(5).
137. Id. § 547(c)(7).
138. Through a combination of provisions, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. i o9-8, 119 Stat. 23, generally sought to benefit the
recipients of domestic support obligations ("DSOs"). For example, BAPCPA tightened restrictions
on the discharge of DSOs, raised the priority of DSOs, and increased related exceptions to the
automatic stay. See Roger M. Baron & Cassidy M. Stalley, The Top Ten Things the Family Law Attorney
Should Know About the Recent Changes in Bankruptcy Law, J. Mo. B., May-June 2011, at 170, 170-72.
This exception may be unnecessary in light of the fact that DSOs receive the highest priority of all
claims, aside from the chapter 7 trustee's administrative expenses in recovering funds. See i U.S.C.
§ 507 (a) (i). Accordingly, it seems unlikely that many, if any, transfers to a DSO will satisfy the final
prong of preference law, and that the transfer has made the recipient better off than they would
have been under a chapter 7 distribution. See id. § 5 4 7(b) (5).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (8). Dollar amounts will change on April 1, 2016.
140. Id. § 547(c) (9). Dollar amounts will change on April 1, 2016.
141. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Pt. 1 at 206 (1973).
142. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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benefit analysis,,43 the floor is intended to protect smaller creditors from a
trustee's avoidance action. It may be presumed that those who have received
smaller amounts from the debtor are themselves smaller creditors. Smaller
creditors will likely suffer more from an avoidance action since they are
presumably less able to sustain losses. They are also presumably less capable
of asserting a defense against such a claim, particularly in a remote venue,
which is common in bankruptcy proceedings.44 Again, these concerns do not
further equal distribution among creditors and-assuming, as is true
generally, that creditors are not distinguished according to their size or the
size of their claims-may actually undermine it. 145
f Nonprofit Budget and Credit Counseling'46
Congress added the final true exception to the Code as part of the 2005
Amendments,m47 which generally sought to encourage repayment of
consumer debt, whether in or out of bankruptcy.,48 In keeping with this
underlying policy goal, the exception indicates that a trustee may not avoid
transfers made as part of a payment schedule "created by an approved
nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency."49 Through this exception,
Congress sought to encourage these types of repayment plans outside the
bankruptcy system.'s5 The fear was that creditors might not accept such
payments if they would then possibly be subject to a preference action, should
the payment plan fail to keep the debtor out of bankruptcy. This exception
therefore prefers payments made under such a plan, undermining a strict
equality approach.
143. See, e.g., In re Arnold, 176 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995); see also In re Riverside-
Linden Inv. Co., 925 F.2d 320, 322 (9 th Cir. 1991).
144. Margolis, supra note 46, at 591 (noting that normal standards for minimal contacts do
not apply in bankruptcy court).
145. Note that in business reorganizations, creditors with smaller claims may be treated
differently than other creditors by virtue of being classified separately for administrative
convenience. i s U.S.C. § 1 1 22 (b). This only reinforces the different approaches exercised in a
chapter 7 liquidation versus a chapter it reorganization. See infra notes 162-72 and
accompanying text.
146. This exception is also unlikely to arise with any frequency in the business bankruptcy
context. See infra Part III (discussing business bankruptcy filings in chapters 7 and i s).
147. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
1o9-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
148. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative Histoy of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 495 (2005) (referencing early concerns that the
bankruptcy system made it too easy for individuals to discharge debts rather than repay them);
Press Release, White House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer
Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2005/04/2 00 5 04 2o-5 .html.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 7 (h).
15o . The preference safe harbor for such repayment plans was part of the BAPCPA section
titled "Promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution." See BAPCPA § 201.
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C. ENFORCEMENT ACROSS CHAPTERS
A final point necessary to understand preference law is the way it works
across the different chapters in bankruptcy. Generally speaking, preference
actions may arise in either the liquidation context, under chapter 7
proceedings, or in reorganizations under chapter 11.15- Currently, the
provisions granting a trustee the authority to pursue preferences are
applicable across all chapters of bankruptcy, but arise with precipitously
reduced frequency in chapters aside from 7 or i i. For example, preference
actions may also apply to municipal bankruptcies in chapter 9,152 and to the
reorganization of family farmers and fishermen in chapter 1 2.,53 Because of
the infrequency of these cases in general, however,54 this Article does not
address policy concerns specific to them. Preference actions cannot be
brought in international bankruptcies under chapter 15,'55 and the authority
to bring preference actions in chapter 13, which permits the reorganization
of individual wage earners,56 is uncertain, for reasons explained below.
A chapter 13 trustee distributes money pursuant to the chapter 13 plan
proposed by the debtor, and generally oversees the debtor's financial
affairs.57 The trustee does not take control of the debtor's estate.58 Because
the statute makes no express provision permitting or prohibiting a chapter 13
trustee from exercising a trustee's avoidance powers, courts are split on
whether the chapter 13 trustee or the chapter 13 debtor, or both, have the
responsibility and the standing to bring a preference action.59 It may be that
151. Chapter 1 1 is typically used in the context of business reorganizations; however, it is
possible for individuals to file for chapter ii. See ii U.S.C. § lo9(d) (providing that a person who
may be a debtor under chapter 7 "may be a debtor under chapter i I"). Because individual chapter
11 cases make up a substantially small portion of the overall filings, see U.S. BANKR. COURTS,
BUSINESS AND NoNBUsINESS CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING
THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2013, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2o 13/1213_f2.pdf (identifying a total of 898o
chapter 11 cases, of which 1320 constituted nonbusiness filings), this Article generally assumes a
chapter iI policy aimed at business reorganizations.
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 926 (referencing the authority to bring avoidance actions).
153. See id. § 1203 (giving a debtor in possession all the powers of a trustee serving under
chapter 11).
154. See U.S. BANKR. COURTS, supra note 151 (identifying a total of nine filings in chapter 9
and 395 filings in chapter 12 during 2013, out of a total of 1,071,932 filings overall).
155. Seeil U.S.C. § 1521(a)(7).
156. See id. § o9(e) ("Only an individual with regular income... may be a debtor under
chapter 13 of this tide.").
157. Id. §§ 704(a), 1302.
158. See id. § 1302; TABB, supra note 23, at 88.
159. In reBinghi, 299 B.R. 300, 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The plain language of Section
1303 is quite explicit and does not include the avoidance powers under Chapter 5 of the Code....
Not surprisingly, courts are split on this issue."). The majority of courts have concluded that, in
absence of explicit statutory authority, chapter 13 debtors do not have standing to bring an
avoidance action. See Knapper v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Knapper), 407 F.3 d 573, 583 (3d Cir.
2005) (finding that a chapter 13 debtor cannot invoke trustee's strong-arm powers under
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preference actions are inappropriate in a chapter 13 in any scenario, because
creditors in chapter 13 are entitled to exclusively post-petition income,16° and
preferential transfers are by definition pre-petition assets.' 6' Due to the
uncertainty regarding preference actions in chapter 13, and the distinct
policy concerns raised in individual bankruptcies, it is logical to exclude these
cases, and policy concerns associated with chapter 13, from analysis.
Accordingly, this Subpart will limit its discussion of enforcement to
business bankruptcy filings in chapters 7 and i i. In a chapter 7 liquidation, a
preference action would be brought by the chapter 7 trustee, acting on behalf
of the bankruptcy estate. The chapter 7 trustee, like all bankruptcy trustees,
is appointed by the United States Trustee ("UST"),' 62 an office of the
Department of Justice that serves to carry out the administration of
bankruptcy cases.' 63 The chapter 7 trustee has the duty to collect the assets of
the estate, liquidate those assets, object to claims as needed, and file a final
report and accounting explaining how the liquidated assets will be
distributed.164 As part of these collection efforts, the chapter 7 trustee has the
authority to avoid preferential transfers. 165 The chapter 7 trustee also has a
§ 5 4 4 (b) (1)); Stangel v. United States (In re Stangel), 2a9 F.3 d 498, 501 (5 th Cir. 2000) (finding
chapter 13 debtors lack standing to bring avoidance action under § 545); LaBarge v. Benda (In
re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364-65 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (the statutory language of § 548
expressly confers avoidance powers exclusively on the trustee); In re Binghi, 299 B.R. at 301-02
(holding that the plain language of § 1303, which details the "Rights and powers of debtor," does
not include avoidance powers). However, a significant minority has concluded the opposite. See
also Houston v. Eiler (In re Cohen), 305 B.R. 886, 889-9oo (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004); Realty
Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In reHamilton), 125 F.3 d 292, 296 (5 th Cir. 1997) (noting the issue,
and listing courts on either side of the issue, but declining to address the issue and reversing on
other grounds); United States v. Dewes, 315 B.R. 834,836-37 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (concluding that
the bankruptcy court's ruling granting a debtor standing to avoid a preference was not clearly
erroneous); Russo v. Ciavarella (In re Ciavarella), 28 B.R. 823, 825-26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(ruling that a chapter 13 trustee cannot bring a preference action over the objections of a chapter
13 debtor).
s6o. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a).
161. There is the possibility that the existence of a preferential transfer could impact the best
interests test. See id. § 1325 (a) (4) (requiring creditors receive more under a chapter 13 plan than
they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation). If a transfer would have been avoided in
chapter 7, this could require a greater payout in chapter 13). Id.; see also In re Ciavarella, 28 B.R.
at 826. However, a preference would not need to be actually recovered; the amount could easily
be estimated by the court for purposes of the Best Interests Test. Actual recovery would provide
no benefit for creditors. For additional discussion, see generally Al Teel, Why Are Chapter r3 Debtors
Still "Standing" in Their Battle for Trustee's Avoidance Powers?: A Call to Resolve the Current Circuit Split,
43 CUMB. L. REV. 311, 329-39 (2013).
162. The UST is commonly referred to as the "watchdog" of the bankruptcy process. SeeAnne
E. Wells, Not in My House: Combating Unethical Mortgage Lender Practices and Related Attorney
Misconduct in the Bankruptcy Courts, 32 CAL. BANKR.J. 483, 507-o8 (2013).
163. See TABB, supra note 23, at 89-9o; Michael D. Sousa, A Delicate Balancing Act: Satisfying
the Fourth Amendment While Protecting the Bankruptcy System from DebtorFraud, 28YALEJ. ON REG. 367,
376 (2011).
164. See TABB, supra note 23, at 87.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
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fiduciary duty to administer the estate expeditiously and to consider the best
interests of the parties.' 66 The trustee is compensated in proportion to the
money recovered on behalf of the estate.' 67 As a consequence, the chapter 7
trustee's fiduciary duty and personal incentives generally align to encourage
the pursuit and recapture of preferential transfers, as long as it would be in
the best interests of the estate.
In a chapter i i, a trustee is not appointed unless cause is shown.' 68 Such
cause typically involves egregious misbehavior by existing management, such
as fraud or embezzlement,' 69 although cause may also be demonstrated by
gross mismanagement, such as the failure to keep legal records.17o Instead,
chapter 1 1 estates are typically managed by the debtor, acting as debtor-in-
possession ("DIP"). The DIP acts as the fiduciary representative of the
bankruptcy estate, and exercises all of a trustee's duties, rights, and powers,
except investigation and reporting of the debtor's misconduct.17'
Accordingly, in a chapter 11, it is usually the debtor's responsibility, in its
capacity as DIP, to initiate and pursue a preference action.'7
The decision to initiate a preference action is discretionary.'73 Although
there are practical constraints on a trustee or a DIP's decision to bring an
transfer avoidance action, discussed in greater detail below, there are no legal
requirements detailing when a trustee must bring an action, only
circumstances in which the trustee "may not' avoid a transaction in the
presence of defenses.,74 Trustees and DIPs are presumed to take costs of an
action into account,'75 in addition to other relevant factors. Trustees in
chapter 7 are generally concerned with maximizing the estate for the benefit
of creditors, and so they are conscious of a particular action's likely success in
166. Id. § 7 o4(a)(1).
167. See id. § 326(a) (explaining that in a case under chapter 7, the court may compensate a
trustee up to 25% of the first $5ooo, io% on the next $45,000, 5% on the next $950,ooo, and
3 % of all excess of moneys disbursed to creditors).
168. Id. § 1 04(a) (1) ("[T] he court shall order the appointment of a trustee-( i) for cause,
including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor
by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause,
but not including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or
liabilities of the debtor.").
169. SeeTABB, supra note 23, at 1o62.
17o . Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter ri Business Governance: Fiduciary
Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV.J. 1, 56-57 (1989).
171. See 1U.S.C.§ 1107(a).
172. Debtors in chapter 12, which facilitates the bankruptcy of family farmers or fisherman,
see id. § iog(f), have similar authority to DIPs. Id. § 1203.
173. See id. § 5 4 7(b) ("[T]he trustee mayavoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor.
(emphasis added). But see infta note 198.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (emphasis added).
175. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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relation to the costs imposed on the estate in pursuit of that action.,7 Such
concerns are not directly associated with equality of distribution, and may
undermine it, if equal treatment proves too costly to achieve. A DIP's decision
is likely to be informed by a strategic analysis of how preference actions can
most benefit the debtor, and by extension, the creditors of the estate.,77 This
analysis is even less likely to include, and may be directly contrary to,
considerations of equal treatment among creditors.' 78
II. PART TWO: THE POLIC(IES) OF PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS IN
IMPLEMENTATION
This Part will analyze how preference law currently struggles to fulfill its
intended policy goal of equal distribution. It will demonstrate how the goal of
equal distribution conflicts with bankruptcy goals of maximizing the estate
and promoting the debtor's ongoing survival in both the chapter 7 context
and, to a much greater extent, in chapter i i. In both chapter 7 and chapter
i , equality of distribution is generally subservient to other policy goals, as
reflected by the procedures of business liquidation or reorganization.
The policies of estate maximization and debtor survival also inform how
preference law is implemented in both chapters. Those who enforce
preference law rarely take actions motivated by a policy of equal distribution.
Instead, they are more likely to be influenced by broader considerations of
bankruptcy policy. For example, a chapter 7 trustee is more likely to be
motivated to act in ways that will maximize creditor payout, and this
motivation will continue to play a primary role in a decision whether or not
to pursue preference actions. A chapter i i DIP, on the other hand, is more
likely to be motivated to act in ways that will promote the continuation of the
business, and ensure a better financial position for the business once it
emerges from bankruptcy. This thinking will also inform decisions regarding
preferences.
A. THE PoLIcY OFEQUAL DISTPJBUTIONIN CHAPTER 7
Chapter 7 trustees have a fiduciary duty by statute to "collect and reduce
to money the property of the estate.. . and close such estate as expeditiously
as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interests.",79 In fulfilling
176. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential
Conflicts ofInterest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REv. 913, 933 (1994).
177. In recognition of the tendency towards acting in one's own self-interest, the Bankruptcy
Code imposes fiduciary duties on the DIP that run to creditors of the estate, but these duties do
not generally curtail the DIP's authority to act. See Steve H. Nickles, Behavioral Effect of New
Bankruptcy Law on Management and Lawyers: Collage of Recent Statutes and Cases Discouraging Chapter
xi Bankruptcy, 59 ARK. L. REv. 329, 400-02 (2oo6); Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency
Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter I1, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 526 (1998).
178. See infra notes 193-94.
179. ii U.S.C. § 704(a)(1).
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this duty, chapter 7 trustees generally have similar incentives to the creditors
of the estate: to find the money quickly and efficiently, and get it distributed
according to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7 trustees
frequently must exercise business judgment in administering a bankruptcy
estate, taking into account the costs and benefits of any particular action.'8 o
For example, a debtor's assets are often already encumbered by one or more
security interests when the trustee collects them into the estate. It will be up
to the trustee to determine whether sale of encumbered assets is in the best
interests of the estate, based on the anticipated value the assets have and the
amount of the underlying loan. In situations where sale of the asset is unlikely
to result in a recovery for the estate, because the asset is worth very little, the
costs of maintaining the assets are very high, or the asset is already fully
encumbered, the trustee should abandon the property.'8 ' The trustee makes
that judgment,,82 although other parties may request a court order of
abandonment if they can establish that the asset is burdensome to the
estate.,83
The chapter 7 trustee's judgment in the decision to pursue preference
actions is also given deference.'8 4 From the perspective of maximizing the
estate, it is vital to exercise judgment in deciding to pursue or "abandon"
preference actions. The costs of pursuing a preference might be extensive or
the delay in distributing the estate to creditors may undermine any overall
benefit they would receive as a result.1s5 Primary considerations for a chapter
1 8o. This is generally true, although there may be instances where the cost benefit analysis
for the particular case must be subjugated to the superior demands of protecting the system, as
in the case of a particularly bad actor. For example, it may not be in the best interests of creditors
to object to a debtor's discharge (if the debtor is likely to be judgment-proof for the foreseeable
future), but the action may nevertheless be called for in light of the debtor's flagrant abuse of
the system. See id. § 727(a) (listing reasons for which a debtor should be denied a discharge,
including transfer or destruction of estate property, lying to the court, and refusing to obey lawful
orders of the court); see also In re Brook Mays Music Co., No. 06-32816, 2007 WL 4 9 60375 , at *1
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2007) (noting relationship between exercise of avoidance power and
fiduciary duty to the estate).
181. See ii U.S.C. § 554; Joseph S. Maniscalco, Note, At the Crossroads of Environmental Laws
and the Bankruptcy Code: Abandonment and Trustee Personal Liability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 879, 894
(1995) ("Some commentators have argued that the clear language of § 54 4(a), coupled with the
lack of legislative history seems to indicate only one result: 'the trustee's cost-benefit analysis
should be the sole consideration in abandonment decisions.'" (citations omitted)).
182. See In reMeyers, 139 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
183. '1 U.S.C. § 5 5 4 (b).
184. See id. § 5 4 7 (b); see also Surf N Sun Apts., Inc. v. Dempsey, 253 B.R. 490, 491 (M.D. Fla.
1999) (holding that only the trustee has standing to prosecute fraudulent transfer actions). But
see In re Racing Servs., Inc., 540 F.3 d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2oo8) (holding that "derivative standing
is available to a creditor to pursue avoidance actions when a chapter 7 trustee ... is unable or
unwilling to do so" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
185. Case law further suggests that a chapter 7 trustee is prohibited from selling rights to a
preference action, which might otherwise permit the chapter 7 trustee to recover funds by virtue
of the preference action without expending the necessary costs for recover. See In re Sapolin
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7 trustee faced with a possible preference action include the ease of
establishing the underlying elements, particularly whether the presumption
of insolvency will arise, i86 the availability of defenses, and the likelihood of
collection, which may depend on the characteristics of the creditor-
defendant. 187
As a result, the policy of a truly equal distribution is frequently sacrificed
in favor of a more general incentive to maximize the value of the estate.
Chapter 7 trustees have no duty to pursue preference actions to the overall
detriment of the bankruptcy estate. It would be a truly harsh, vindictive, and
inefficient law that would put the strict equality of creditors ahead of estate
maximization, and one unlikely to retain many supporters. In other words,
few would suggest, to use a famous analogy, that Solomon's proposal to split
a newborn baby in half in order to satisfy the legally equal claims of two would-
be mothers would have been a superior result to preserving the baby's life
(thereby maximizing its value) and giving the child to one of the two women,
even though doing so would necessitate unequal treatment.'18
However, it does not necessarily follow that in all scenarios the policy
interest in equal distribution must fall victim to the interest in maximizing the
estate. To the extent that the costs of recovering preferences are minimized,
most preference proceedings both establish equality among creditors and
increase the amount available for general distribution, at the expense of
preferred creditors. As costs to the estate are reduced, an increasing number
of preference actions satisfy both policy goals.
B. THE POLIcy OFEQUAL DISRBUTIoN IN CHAPTER It
The procedures and policy of bankruptcy reorganization are much less
concerned with equal distribution. In theory, successful debtor
reorganization in chapter i i should have the effect of maximizing creditor
repayment while simultaneously preserving the value of the debtor's business
as a going concern,'8 9 thereby protecting individuals who would otherwise
Paints, Inc., 11 B.R. 930, 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. g81); Brendan Gage, Is There a Statutory Basis For
SeUingAvoidance Actions?, 22 NORTONJ. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 art. i (May 2013).
186. Pursuant to I I U.S.C. § 5 4 7(f), the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and
during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy. However, no such presumption arises for transfers to or
for the benefit of an insider in the year before the filing, requiring a higher showing of proof by
the trustee. For an argument that the requirement of insolvency should be removed for insider
cases, see Ponoroff, supra note 8, at 15o8-14.
187. See Tom Connolly, Speaker at the Rocky Mountain Bankruptcy Conference, ABI
Concurrent Session Giant Slalom: Hitting the Gates in Carrying Out the Duties of a Trustee or
Examiner; Remedies for Creditors When the Gates Are Missed (Jan. 23, 2014) (noting that credit
card companies and banks are more likely to repay preferences, whereas an individual's elderly
mother makes a less desirable preference target).
188. See i Kings 3:16-28.
18g. This assumes, of course, that the ultimate goal of a chapter 1i filing is reorganization;
"Reorganization" is the tide of chapter 11, accordingly, this seems at the outside to be a safe
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bear the brunt of the business failure: employees, residents of plant towns,
and other community members affected by a business closure.,9o
Reorganization is accordingly permitted, with some limitations, even when
some creditors of the bankruptcy estate might prefer liquidation proceedings
as a faster, less risky, or more efficient method of ensuring at least partial
repayment.'9' Most of the discussion regarding the purpose of business
reorganization tends to question the extent to which bankruptcy law should
account for the interests of non-creditors who would also be affected by the
debtor's failure, and permit reorganization even over the objections of
creditors. 192
Lost in this discussion is the policy of equal distribution among creditors.
The overarching purpose of bankruptcy reorganization is to resuscitate
potentially profitable companies-ensuring that one creditor is paid no more
than another is a secondary goal at best. In chapter 11, the DIP retains greater
flexibility when it comes to creditor repayment than the pro rata scheme
required for bankruptcy liquidation. The DIP may propose a repayment plan
that gives some creditors a greater proportionate payout than others, limited
only by the admonition that the plan does not "discriminate unfairly,"os and
the baseline that no creditor receive less than it would have under a chapter
7 liquidation.'94 It can accomplish this by placing creditors in classes,95 and
assumption. However, it is well documented that chapter 1 may also be used as a method of
liquidation, and data suggests that it is increasingly so used. See discussion infra Part III.C.
19 o . See Buder & Gilpatric, supra note 24, at 284; Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy
System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 16og, 1613-14 (2009); Warren, supra note 25, at 787-88. In practice, of
course, this may not be possible. Even in the best of situations, businesses may fail for reasons
associated with economic fluctuations, natural disasters, or other events difficult to predict in
advance. Debtors in a chapter 1 case are in far from the best of situations, frequently
undercapitalized and overleveraged, with a history of failure and creditors who may be even less
cooperative than under normal circumstances. Filing for bankruptcy can also impose additional
costs on a struggling debtor that can exacerbate these problems. See SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR
LAWYERS 1 1-14 (1989); Edith H. Jones, Chapter ii: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor Interests,
77 CORNELLL. REV. lo88, 1O91 (1992).
191. This may be particularly true for secured creditors, who might expect full repayment
upon liquidation, with reorganization providing no additional benefit. See WARREN ET AL., supra
note 24, at 430.
192. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
193. See 1l U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(1) (2012); see also discussion supra note 191 and infra note 195
regarding cramdown.
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7). This provision is commonly known as the "Best Interests
Test." See TABB, supra note 23, at 103.
195. See ii U.S.C. § 1122(a) (providing that claims may only be classified together if they are
substantially similar to each other, but failing to state that similar claims must be classified
together). There are some judicially created constraints on classification as reflected in case law.
See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone HI Joint Venture (In re Greystone IIIJoint Venture),
995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5 th Cir. 1991) (identifying as "the one clear rule that emerges from
otherwise muddled caselaw" that "thou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to
gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan"); Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus.
Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In reU.S. Truck Co.), 8oo F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1986)
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then providing each class with its own schedule for repayment.,96 In a chapter
i i plan, individual creditors may also receive additional benefits if they agree
to provide financing to the debtor post-petition.197 Further, some creditors
may demand, and be given, better treatment to the extent that their votes, for
reasons of size or particular classification, are necessary for confirmation of
the chapter 11 plan. Because of this latitude, it is possible for a particular
creditor or group to receive preferential treatment in chapter 1 1 compared
with other creditors who are similarly situated, but strategically less important
to the debtor on a forward-looking basis.
The true exceptions to preference liability reflect this permissive attitude
regarding unequal treatment of creditors. Transfers that provide a benefit to
the estate in the days leading up to bankruptcy are not avoided, because the
law is more concerned with ensuring the debtor's continuing survival than
policing the absolute equality of creditor payout. Accordingly, similarly
situated creditors do not necessarily receive an equal distribution of the estate
as a consequence of preference policy, even though this is the stated rationale
for permitting the avoidance of preferential transfers in the first place.,98 The
discretion afforded to a chapter 1 1 DIP also reflects this ordering of priorities.
A DIP may elect not to pursue certain avoidable preferences even in the
absence of an applicable exception. Although there is some oversight of a
DIP's decision in this matter, 199 preferences can be permitted to stand,
("We agree ... that there must be some limit on a debtor's power to classify creditors in such a
manner. The potential for abuse would be significant otherwise."); see also King F. Tower,
"Cramdown" Confirmation of Single-Asset Debtor Reorganization Plans Through Separate Classification of
the Deficiency Claim-How In Re U.S. Truck Co. Was Run Offthe Road, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 169,
1170 (1995) ("Depending upon which court hears the case, such separate classification amounts
to either an improper manipulation of the Code's voting process or a legitimate use of the Code's
unambiguous provisions on reorganization.").
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (4) (providing that all claims within a given class receive the
same treatment).
197. See id. § 364 (c); In reHubbard Power & Light, 202 B.R. 68o, 685 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(approving priming lien to post-petition financer).
198. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
199. As in chapter 7, there are some restrictions on a DIP's decision whether or not to pursue
a preference action. See supra Part II. As an initial matter, any decision regarding a possible
preferential transfer would probably need to be included in the debtor's disclosure statement
and/or plan, which would be distributed to the court, the UST, and all creditors. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1123, 1125(a); Harstadv. FirstAm. Bank, 39 F.3 d 898,903 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Creditors have the
right to know of any potential causes of action that might enlarge the estate-and that could be used
to increase payment to the creditors."). The UST has the opportunity to be heard on the adequacy
of a disclosure statement, and the statement must be approved by the court prior to the submission
of any plan to creditors or the solicitation of votes for a plan. 15 U.S.C. §§ 112 5 (b), (d). In addition,
a majority of courts have ruled that a creditor derivative action may be available if the DIP declines
to pursue a meritorious action. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex
rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3 d 548, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2003) (permitting a creditors'
committee derivative standing to pursue an action to avoid a fraudulent transfer when the DIP
refused, thereby violating its fiduciary duty to maximize the estate); Canadian Pac. Forest Prods. Ltd.
v.J.D. Irving, Ltd., (In re Gibson Grp., Inc.), 66 F.3d 1436, 1438-39 (6th Cir. 1995) (permitting a
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particularly if the DIP can establish a convincing case that the cooperation of
the defendant creditor is necessary for the successful implementation of a
plan of reorganization.2o°
In chapter 1 1, the policy of equal distribution will consistently take
second priority on the theory that permitting the business to continue as a
going concern will maximize the overall distribution for creditors and the
welfare of others associated with the business. Although manifestly unfair
inequities are prohibited, a strict policy of equal distribution has no place in
the more flexible standards accorded to reorganizing businesses.
C. REORGANIZATIONAS LIQUIDATIONIN CHAPTER II
Unfortunately for the ease of dividing policy along the lines of
liquidation and reorganization, there is a well-documented and growing trend
of companies using chapter 1 i to accomplish what is in essence liquidation. °-
This may be accomplished through filing a chapter 11 plan that anticipates
the sale of the company, or, with growing frequency, the sale of assets, subject
to court approval, even before a plan is filed.202 Although many of these sales
are conducted to preserve the going concern value of the business-a core
justification for any plan of reorganization-a sale may also be conducted in
chapter 1 1 in the same form it would have taken in a chapter 7, with assets
auctioned off piecemeal.203
creditor to initiate an avoidance action instead of the DIP if the creditor has alleged a colorable
claim, made an unanswered demand on the DIP to pursue the claim, and the DIP's refusal is
unjustified in light of statutory obligations and fiduciary duties). But see Haller, supra note 65, at
397-405 (arguing that permitting such derivative actions is contrary to the plain meaning of the
Code). Finally, creditors who are unhappy with a debtor's decision not to avoid a preferential
transfer may express their displeasure by voting against the debtor's plan, preventing its
implementation, or at least forcing the debtor to comply with the "cramdown" provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. See generally 1 U.S.C. § 112 9 (b); TABB, supra note 23, at 1150-53.
200. See Benjamin R. Norris, Bankruptcy Preference Actions, 121 BANKING L.J. 483, 512-13
(2004) (suggesting that DIPs may be willing to compromise on preference claims when hoping
to maintain a relationship with the targeted creditor).
201. SeeChad P. Pugatch et al., The LostArt of Chapteri i Reorganization, 19 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y39, 62-63 (2oo8); Elizabeth Warren &Jay L. Westbrook, Remembering Chapter 7, AM. BANKR.
INST.J., May 2004, at 22; see also In reAll Am. of Ashburn, Inc., 40 B.R. 104, io8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1984) (denying creditors' motion to convert case to chapter 7 on the grounds that permitting
liquidation under chapter 11 "would be more time and cost efficient" than going forward in
chapter 7); Field Hearing at Austin Friday, November 22, ABI COMM'N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF
CHAPTER 11 (noting that a survey conducted among Texas practitioners in chapter 11 found that
chapter ii is different than 1o years ago by virtue of the increased use of i U.S.C. § 363 sales
or liquidation).
202. See 1i1 U.S.C. § 36 3 (b) (stating that after notice and a hearing, the trustee may sell
property of the estate outside of the ordinary course of business); Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363
Sales, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 262 (2012). See generally Elizabeth B. Rose, Comment,
Chocolate, Howers, and § 3 63 (b): The OpportunityforSweetheart Deals Without Chapter ri Protections, 23
EMORY BANKR. DEv.J. 249 (2oo6).
203. SeePugatch et al., supra note 201, at 61-64 (discussing the use of a "liquidating trust" in
chapter i j).
[Vol. 100:51
2014] CONFLICTING PREFERENCES IN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 87
Justification for permitting such "chapter i 1 liquidations" is found most
frequently in the efficiency of using preexisting management to liquidate
rather than bringing in and paying a trustee to accomplish the same task.
Arguably, the DIP is able to obtain a better price for estate assets, both by
virtue of its connections in the relevant field and its superior ability to operate
the business until the most beneficial deal can be reached.204 The wisdom of
permitting such a sale in chapter 11 has been vigorously debated however,205
and such practices raise legitimate questions regarding the role of chapter 7
in business bankruptcy, and by extension, the role of the policies and values
that inform a chapter 7 distribution.
Although these broader questions are outside the scope of this Article,
the ability of businesses to liquidate in chapter 1 1 through a piecemeal sale
of assets (rather than sale as a going concern) must inform the ultimate
recommendation for dealing with preference actions. If chapter i i is used as
a liquidating chapter rather than an opportunity to preserve a debtor's going
concern value, then policy considerations associated with a chapter 7
liquidation should predominate, and the availability of preference actions
adjusted accordingly.2o 6 This may undermine the effort to cleanly distinguish
between liquidation and reorganization cases.
Recognizing this conflict, for ease of explanation this Article will
continue to refer to the policy considerations tied up in chapter 1 1 and
chapter 7 as if chapter I i operated exclusively to preserve going concern
value, rather than debtor control. Presumably, any measures taken to adopt
the proposal advocated below would need to account for chapter 1 1
"liquidations," perhaps by requiring conversion to chapter 7 once
preservation of the business as a going concern is no longer at issue,
permitting a chapter 1 i trustee or DIP to pursue preference actions once a
liquidating plan is confirmed, or a similar approach.
III. PART THREE: PROPOSALS FOR RECONCILIATION
Despite its apparent importance in the legislative history,207 it is evident
that, depending on the particular chapter, policymakers are less concerned
with ensuring that all creditors receive an equal portion of the debtor's estate
than they are with maximizing the overall amount distributed to creditors, or
the benefit to other parties interested in the debtor's survival. Similarly,
creditors seem more preoccupied with the costs of defending against
preference actions than the moral victory in seeing a fellow creditor subject
204. See Robert P. Simons, Liquidating Assets Through a Chapter i r Sale and Plan of Liquidation
Rather Than a Chapter 7 Liquidation, in CHAPTER 7 COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES, available
at 2013 WL 93623 o at *3, *8; Warren & Westbrook, supra note 20 1, at 22.
205. SeeWarren & Westbrook, supra note 201, at 22.
2o6. Otherwise, this proposal runs the risk of making chapter 11 a safe haven for creditors
who would otherwise be subject to a preference action.
207. See Countryman, supra note 36, at 748.
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to the exact same pro rata distribution.2o8 Recognizing this, the question
becomes how to shape preference law in such a way that it responds to these
concerns without sacrificing more of its underlying justification-equal
distribution-than is necessary to meet conflicting policy goals. The solution
is to adapt preference law by chapter, maintaining principles of equal
distribution when reasonable and abandoning them when not.20 9
A. PREFERENCES BY CHAPTER
The relative unimportance of equal distribution in chapter 1 1 suggests
that maintaining preference actions in the reorganization context is a
misguided effort. The incongruity between the overarching motivations for
reorganization and preference policy creates a tension that cannot be
resolved, and is only exacerbated, by establishing multiple, broadly defined
exceptions. Instead, many of the concerns associated with preference law that
are relevant in a reorganization context, like egregious overreaching or fraud,
can be managed by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. More general
preference liability, embodying a strict policy of equal distribution, should be
reserved for cases of liquidation, where the pro rata distribution is more
important. In these cases, the costs of preference actions should be minimized
by eliminating true exceptions, particularly those intended to promote the
debtor's ongoing business. Continuing to avoid preferences in the liquidation
context will provide appropriate deterrence to creditors who might otherwise
"race to the courthouse," even in situations where the debtor opts for
reorganization over liquidation.
i. Chapter ii
Chapter 11 places reduced emphasis on equality of distribution among
creditors. Accordingly, a strict policy of equal distribution in reorganization
cases is misplaced. The availability of preference actions serves only to
discourage interactions with the debtor in the period leading up to
bankruptcy, for fear that creditors who engage in business with the debtor
may subsequently be subject to an avoidance action .2 ° The exceptions are
intended to displace that fear, but are inadequate because of the costs
associated with defending a preference action and the uncertainty about the
scope of the exceptions themselves.211 Given the lack of priority placed on
absolute equality, even among similarly situated debtors, preference law is
both unnecessary and unwelcome in the reorganization context.
208. See Comments of KathyTomlin, supra note 16.
209. This proposal may be informed by the reality that chapter i can and has been used to
accomplish a liquidation, rather than a reorganization. See discussion supra Part III.C.
210. See supra Part III.B.
21 1. See supra notes 16- 19 and accompanying text.
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This is not to say that there is no value in ensuring parity among similarly
situated creditors in a chapter 1 1 case, or that the creditors themselves might
not view this as a priority. To the contrary, there is a lingering concern for
equality among equals in chapter I 1. This is represented by both the
requirements that all members of a class receive equal treatment in a
reorganization plan and the existence of judicial scrutiny regarding
classification. Further, creditors as a group may well object to the debtor's
preferential treatment of particular creditors, and chapter 1 1 permits
creditors to exercise their objections by raising them before the court12 or
voting against the proposed plan.lis Even more importantly, most concerns
associated with the extreme or "idiosyncratic"14 transfers that would be
undisputed targets of preference law can be addressed by alternative
Bankruptcy Code provisions. For example, transfers made with an intent to
"hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors are already subject to avoidance outside
of preference law pursuant to restrictions on fraudulent transfers.215 In
addition, a trustee's strong-arm powers,, 6 which permit the trustee to avoid
transfers that would be avoidable under applicable state law, could be used to
target transfers to insiders at a time that the insider had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent.217 Further, in cases where unfair
transfers could only be addressed by preference law, it could be exercised by
converting the case to chapter 7, as discussed below.2Is In this way, lingering
concerns regarding equal distribution in chapter i i could be satisfied without
using preference law.
2. Chapter 7
Freed from the concerns associated with preserving the debtor as a going
concern, preference law can return to its purpose of equal distribution in the
liquidation context. In chapter 7, the primary policy concern is maximizing
the estate for distribution to creditors, with the requirement that that
distribution will be equal as to similarly situated creditors.219 A chapter 7
liquidation requires that all existing, non-exempt assets be sold or otherwise
disposed of, with the proceeds going to creditors. For individuals, this
212. See ii U.S.C. § 1103(c) (2012).
213. See id. § 1126(a); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 697 (3 d ed. 1996) (stating that the power of creditors to reject a plan
is the most important check on a debtor).
214. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3 d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993).
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 8.
216. See id. § 5 4 4 .
217. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT (UFTA) § 5 (b) (1984). The UFTA has been
adopted by the majority of states.
218. See ii U.S.C.§70 7 (b).
219. See id. § 7 26(b) (providing for payments to be "made pro rata among claims" in each
particular class or grouping).
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implicates the principle of a "fresh start": all post-petition assets are the
debtor's, but all non-exempt pre-petition assets go to the estate.2 2 0 For
corporate entities, chapter 7 is a place to expire; businesses are given no "fresh
start," but instead divided among creditors until nothing remains."'
Accordingly, chapter 7 is not at all concerned with encouraging ongoing
business relations with the debtor, and any past efforts to save the debtor from
liquidation must be deemed ineffective, or at the least, inadequate. Instead,
the concern that all creditors be treated fairly-meaning subject to equal
terms of distribution-is predominant.
Chapter 7 is also concerned with maximizing the proceeds from
disposition of estate assets and minimizing the costs associated with recovery
of those proceeds. Accordingly, the best policy in chapter 7 would enable
trustees to recover preferential transfers as swiftly and cheaply as possible.
This could be accomplished on multiple fronts. First, limiting or
removing the existence of "true" exceptions would expand the number of
transfers subject to avoidance and reduce the cost and time necessary to
recover them. In addition, the presumption of insolvency could be expanded
past the go-day period to include a more substantial period of time, thereby
reducing the trustee's burden to show insolvency in proceedings to recover
transfers from insiders.222 Finally, the law could provide stronger incentives
for the swift return of preferences by establishing a set rate of interest accrual
on an unrecovered preference, for which the transferee would be liable unless
the preference were returned within a reasonable period of time.23
Although these amendments are unlikely to eliminate the costs of
pursuing preference actions entirely, they would significantly streamline the
process. Creditors might still resist an action to avoid transfers by arguing that
they do not fit the definition of preferences. However, resolution of these
defenses is likely to take less time, and substantially fewer estate resources,
than determination of the current exceptions. Absent such exceptions, in
most situations a defendant creditor would have great difficulty in presenting
a defense that could proceed past summaryjudgment. For example, creditors
have historically struggled to present sufficient evidence to overcome the
statutory presumption of insolvency.24
Preference liability in the liquidation context will reinforce the policy of
deterring creditors' "race to the courthouse," even where the debtor will
ultimately file for chapter i i and general preference liability will not come
into play. This is because creditors cannot always predict what chapter a
220. See id. § 541.
221. See id. § 522(b) (extending exemptions to individual, not corporate, debtors).
222. SeePonoroff, supra note 8, at 1512.
223. Recovery of interest is already available upon a showing of good cause in some courts.
See Kelley v. Chevy Chase Bank (In re Smith), 236 B.R. 91, 103-04 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999).
2 24. See Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Taxel (In reWorld Fin. Servs. Ctr., Inc.), 78 B.R. 239, 241 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1987), affd, 86o F.2d 1o9o (9th Cir. 1988).
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debtor may file in, and a debtor may convert a case from one chapter to
another.225 Unfortunately, the converse of this observation is that the
purported benefit of preference exceptions, to encourage creditor relations
despite a debtor's financial struggles,226 may also be undermined in the
chapter 1 i context due to this uncertainty. Presumably, if a case converted
from chapter 11 to chapter 7, transfers that previously were safe from
preference avoidance actions could then be subject to them.227
In analyzing the scope of this problem, the possible impact of preference
law on creditor behavior228 and the extent of preference liability as a
disincentive to ongoing business relationships should not be overstated. Even
under a strict liability model, simultaneous exchanges would continue to be
protected,229 permitting creditors to continue doing business with the debtor
on those terms.23 0 Further, creditors may have independent incentives to
continue doing business with a debtor even in the days leading up to
bankruptcy-like preserving a supply relationship, or retaining a customer.
It is possible that introducing strict preference liability in chapter 7 will,
due to reluctance to extend credit to floundering debtors, encourage a
marginally higher number of bankruptcies. It is difficult to predict the
number of businesses that would be affected or the net loss incurred (i.e.,
whether a bankruptcy caused by a tighter credit market will represent an
overall loss in value to society, and what the amount of that loss will be). Due
to this uncertainty, it is also difficult to say if those costs would be offset by the
savings accruing from the reduced costs associated with pursuing and
recovering a preference.
However, businesses faced with such a credit dry-up will likely file under
chapter i i rather than chapter 7, if for no other reason than an initial filing
under chapter 7 is an admission of defeat, wherein the debtor relinquishes
control of the business and resigns itself to liquidation.23, Recognizing that
most businesses who can file under chapter 1 1 will do so may also ameliorate
225. See 1 1 U.S.C. § 7o7(b).
226. See Afilalo, supra note 26, at 635; Broome, supra note 3, at 85; Palazzolo, supra note 30,
at 88 1.
227. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (setting the statute of limitations for avoiding powers at the later
of two years after filing or one year after the appointment of a trustee). With a division in
preference law between chapter 7 and chapter 11, § 546 would likely need to be amended to
clarify that the statute of limitations would expire one year after the appointment of a trustee in
chapter 7, in the case of conversion from i1 to 7.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 58-6o.
229. See Tabb, supra note 26, at 1024 (noting that "if the debtor truly is in difficult straits, a
careful creditor will insist on C.O.D. transactions no matter what the preference law says").
230. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81 (discussing the substantially of the
contemporaneous narrowing exception).
231. SeeWARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 213, at 388-89 ("[T]he business debtor almost
never wants to liquidate because, unlike the individual debtor, there is no advantage for the
company in liquidation.... Liquidation is, as the term suggests, death.").
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creditor anxiety about transfers with a struggling debtor. If the debtor will
survive outside of bankruptcy or through chapter i 1, then there is no risk to
receiving payment from the debtor. If the debtor will fail and subsequently
seek liquidation in bankruptcy, then the creditor must expect pro rata
treatment based on strict equal distribution principles.232 Under this analysis,
a creditor will only refuse to do business with a debtor it believes is likely to
ultimately fail and file for liquidation when the benefits of continuing to do
business with the debtor will not outweigh the anticipated loss the creditor
will experience as a consequence of the bankruptcy. But in such a scenario,
this may be the preferable outcome, or at least what is to be expected in a
normal free market. Accordingly, the potential for such an outcome does not
overcome the benefits of a more streamlined system of preference liability.
CONCLUSION
Preference law has become unpopular, at least among creditors,253 in
large part because it is costly and difficult to predict. In addition, preference
policy has lost its theoretical cogency through efforts to reconcile equal
distribution with a system that does not prioritize strict equality over other
values. The many exceptions to preference liability undercut the principle
purpose behind its imposition-to ensure that all similarly situated creditors
receive an equal proportion of the debtor's assets. These exceptions also
impose costs on the trustee and the transferee, decreasing the likelihood that
their recovery will represent an overall benefit to the bankruptcy estate.
The solution to these problems is not to further amend or expand
exceptions, but to do away with general preference liability when a strict policy
of equal distribution is not a priority, and more firmly establish preference
liability when it is. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to
disregard the current section on preferences in a case of bankruptcy
reorganization. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code should remove the true
exceptions to preference liability in the context of bankruptcy liquidation,
thereby promoting a strict equality of distribution, regardless of the creditor's
intent or motivation, and maximizing the estate by reducing the costs of
preference actions. These actions may not make preferences popular, but
they will reduce the inconsistencies and costs surrounding preference law.
232. This assumes restrictions on the availability of chapter 11 liquidations, as discussed supra
text accompanying notes 20 1-o6.
233. As others have noted, and as this author has personally experienced, preference law
remains an engaging and interesting topic for classroom discussion. See Morris, supra note 1, at
737.
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